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
*A Psychoanalytic Journal
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Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*:

(A Psychoanalytic Interpretation)

by

Joseph Levi, Ph.D.

"The publication of *The Scarlet Letter* was in the United States a literary event of first importance. The book was the finest piece of imaginative writing yet put forth in the country. There was a consciousness of this in the welcome that was given it; a satisfaction in the idea of America having produced a novel that belonged to literature and to the forefront of it." Thus Henry James (1, p. 111) describes the initial profound reaction of the American public to *The Scarlet Letter*.

James, of course, was not alone in his admiration for *The Scarlet Letter*. The novel has been, and is, highly regarded by virtually every critic. Mark Van Doren (2, p. 165), for example, describes *The Scarlet Letter* as "still the high mark of American fiction." Robert Cantnell (3, p. 440), in discussing *The Scarlet Letter*, says that it is "The first novel in American fiction to take its place with the masterpieces of world literature." John G. Gerber (4, p. 13) states that it is the "greatest work of fiction yet produced by an American."

The question arises, however, what is it about this book that stirs the reader to his depths? Why is this a great novel? A number of critics have attempted to explain this.

Some claim that its greatness may lie in the theme of the novel. Van Doren, however, asserts that its theme is an old one. In fact, the theme of *The Scarlet Letter* was used a number of times in various ways by Hawthorne himself. The things that puzzle us are how and why he suddenly converted a familiar theme to greatness.

Some critics feel that Hawthorne is dealing with the problem of sin and thus that the novel is a sort of "problem"

novel. Or it is ventured that Hawthorne was attempting to demonstrate the cruelty of the early Puritans toward women. But Hawthorne never had any idea of trying to better the world. He was not a reformer nor did he ever attempt to deal with social problems in his work. Hawthorne never fought for ideals. When he was a consul in Liverpool and observed the mistreatment of British sailors, he was aroused to anger, but not sufficiently so to become embroiled. During his brief stay at Brook Farm, he remained aloof from the Transcendentalists. He was at Brook Farm for a very practical reason. He thought he might establish there a livelihood for himself and a home for his future wife.

Van Doren (2, p. 147) suggests that the greatness of *The Scarlet Letter* may be in the fact that Hawthorne "made the devil concrete and put his finger on the person that he really is." Therein, says Van Doren, lies the secret of Hawthorne's great insight. However, in Hawthorne's previous work, the same refinement of abstract concept to concrete form appears.

Gerber (4, p. 19), however, suggests that the greatness of the novel stems from Hawthorne's having integrated form and content in such a manner that they both exist in a state of interdependence. This, he states, is the most striking aspect of *The Scarlet Letter*. It is, of course, quite true that form and content integration are prerequisites for any successful work of art and without a doubt both are important factors in *The Scarlet Letter*. However, these qualities do not entirely explain the captivating effect of the novel.

Why is *The Scarlet Letter* a great book? It has been stated that the less the artist is conscious of the underlying meaning of his work, the greater the art. And Hawthorne certainly had not had the benefit of psychoanalysis.

The book is great for a number of reasons. Gerber (4, p. XIII) quotes Hawthorne's requirement for a good artistic work. Hawthorne stressed form as the most important element of an artistic work. A great value of *The Scarlet*

Letter is the excellent, almost perfect, form in which it is conceived.

Van Doren (2, p. 146) emphasizes that the characters are alive and are real people rather than symbols. "The persons of the tale were long since types to him, as were their souls' predicaments." But this is not the case in *The Scarlet Letter*. There is a difference. "The difference, at least so far as the three principals are concerned, is in the degree to which Hawthorne feels and honors them as individuals. Formerly, his temptation had been to decorate ideas, to produce rhetoric about emotions, at the expense of the persons in whom he placed them. This had caused a certain coldness in the persons. . . In *The Scarlet Letter* Hawthorne has at last found individuals who can hold all of his thought, and so naturally that even he forgets what his thought is."

Hawthorne's feeling for his characters is certainly an important factor in the greatness of the book. However, the book's real significance may lie in the fact that in addition there exists the factor of psychoanalytic understanding.

None of its critics seem to relate the greatness of this novel to certain events in Hawthorne's life. Relating these events to the period of his writing of the novel gives a clue to the greatness of *The Scarlet Letter* and to the reason for its captivating effect on the people.

When Hawthorne was four years old, his father died at sea. His father was a ship's captain and, even before his death, was but rarely at home. And Hawthorne's sister was born just two weeks before his father left for his last voyage. It is quite significant that his father died at the height of Hawthorne's oedipal complex. And equally significant was the birth of his younger sister in close proximity in time to the death of his father.

Hawthorne's son, in his biography of his father, gives us a penetrating insight into the spirit of the book. Julian Hawthorne (5, p. 335) ways of the writing of *The Scarlet Letter*: ". . . . these (difficult economic) conditions were

noet, it appears, severe enough by themselves for the birth of *The Scarlet Letter*. Midway in its completion, Madam Hawthorne was taken dangerously ill and after a struggle of a few weeks, she died." It was only after the death of his mother that Hawthorne was able to complete the novel.

He experienced the same emotions on reading the final portion of *The Scarlet Letter* to his wife that he had first felt consciously at the time of his mother's death. Randall Stewart (6, p. 95) describes this occurrence: "On the evening of that day, he read the later part of the book to his wife. . . Of his own reactions on that memorable evening, Hawthorne recalled several years later: 'My emotions when I read the last scene of *The Scarlet Letter* to my wife just after writing it — tried to read it, rather, for my voice swelled and heaved, as if I were tossed up and down on an ocean, as it subsides after a storm.' The emotion attests to the author's sincerity (if attestation were needed), the more so because Hawthorne was not in the habit of breaking down." In his notebook, Hawthorne describes his reading of the ending of the book to his wife (Van Doren 2, p. 143): "But I was in a very nervous state then, having gone through a good diversity of emotion, while writing it (*The Scarlet Letter*), for many months. I think I have never overcome my adamant in any other instance."

But another such instance had occurred, just six months before, at the death of his mother. Describing this disturbing event in his notebook, Hawthorne said: "I did not expect to be much moved at the time—that is to say, not to feel any overpowering emotions struggling, just then—though I knew that I should deeply remember and regret her. . . . Then I found the tears slowly gathering in my eyes. I tried to keep them down, but it would not be. I kept filling up, till, for a few moments, I shook with sobs. For a long time I knelt there, holding her hand, and surely it is the darkest hour I ever lived."

There are only two instances, the reading of the last part of *The Scarlet Letter* and the death of his mother, during

which he ever admitted losing control. That there is a connection between these two events is clear.

The inevitable conclusion is that the death of Hawthorne's mother had a great deal to do with the writing of this book. He must have experienced a substantial liberation of energy which allowed him to produce a book of such universal appeal.

Oedipus, Hawthorne, and "The Scarlet Letter"

Analysis reveals that the plot of *The Scarlet Letter* deals with the oedipal theme. It describes the struggle of two men—one older, one younger—for the love of a woman.

Some rather convincing documentation for the oedipal facets of *The Scarlet Letter* exists in a recurring dream of Hawthorne's (his only recorded dream, as a matter of fact) quoted by Van Wyck Brooks (7, p. 224): "He seemed to be walking in a crowded street. Three beautiful girls approached him and, seeing him, screamed and fled. An old friend gave him a look of horror. He was promenading in his shroud." This recurring dream points to a very strong oedipal complex. The three women represent his mother and two sisters. The man walking in his shroud would be the ghost of his father who haunts him and about whom he feels horror.

That there is guilt concerning his father is mentioned by Van Doren (2, p. 33) who says that Hawthorne was very much impressed with the scene that Boswell describes in which Johnson stood in the market place at Uttoxeter and bared his head among the crowd and spoke of a sin that he once committed against his father. Hawthorne was extremely impressed by this story. And he told it three times — in the biographical *Story for Children* in 1842, in *The Scarlet Letter* and in *Our Old Home*. Hawthorne wrote in his private notebook: "Dr. Johnson's penance in Uttoxeter market. A man who does penance in what might appear to lookers-on the most glorious and triumphal circumstances of his life. Each circumstance of the career of an apparently successful man to be a penance and torture him on account of some fundamental error in early life." Van Doren concludes:

"That man would be Arthur Dimmesdale, " (the adulterous parson and Hawthorne's representation of himself in *The Scarlet Letter*).

The strength of Hawthorne's rivalry with his father is seen in a quotation from a letter to his mother in which he discusses his choice of profession. (Stewart 6, p. 11) He finally decides to be an author and this is the reason: "How proud you would feel to see my work praised by the reviewers as equal to the proudest productions of the Scribbling Sons of John Bull." Hawthorne always had great regard and respect for England and always spoke of it as the "Mother Country." John Bull would, therefore, represent the father.

Actually, in the chapter of *The Scarlet Letter*, The Minister's Vigil, Dimmesdale's perceptions can be very well interpreted as an oedipal dream: in this scene, Mr. Dimmesdale arises in the middle of the night and ascends the scaffold. He imagines that he has shrieked, and then burst into a great peal of laughter. This laughter is responded to "by a light, airy, childish laugh, in which, with a thrill of the heart . . . he recognized the tones of little Pearl." With her is Hester who says: "It is I, and my little Pearl." "She silently ascended the steps, and stood on the platform, holding little Pearl by the hand. The minister felt for the child's other hand, and took it. The moment that he did so, there came what seemed a tumultuous rush of new life, other life than his own, pouring like a torrent into his heart, and hurrying through all his veins, as if the mother and the child were communicating their vital warmth to his half-torpid system. The three formed an electric chain . . . a light gleamed far and wide over all the muffled sky. It was doubtless caused by one of those meteors, which the night watcher may so often observe burning out to waste, in the vacant regions of the atmosphere. So powerful was its radiance, that it thoroughly illuminated the dense medium of cloud betwixt the sky and earth. The great vault brightened, like the dome of an immense lamp." " . . . the minister, looking upward

to the zenith, beheld there the appearance of an immense letter—the letter A—marked out in lines of dull red light. . . . All the time that he gazed upward to the zenith, he was, nevertheless, perfectly aware that little Pearl was pointing her finger towards old Roger Chillingworth, who stood at no great distance from the scaffold. . . Certainly, if the meteor kindled up the sky, and disclosed the earth, with an awfulness that admonished Hester Prynne and the clergyman of the day of judgment, then might Roger Chillingworth have passed with them for the archfiend, standing there with a smile and scowl, to claim his own. So vivid was the expression, or so intense the minister's perception of it, that it seemed still to remain painted on the darkness after the meteor had vanished." The next day, the author says, Mr. Dimmesdale was so confused that he looked upon the events of the past night as visionary.

The interpretation of this scene is clear. Mr. Dimmesdale's desire is for Hester (representing Hawthorne's mother). Little Pearl represents the mother's vagina. The meteor is the phallus. Freud describes the libido as nearly always phallic. The meteor has a tail, which represents the penis. At the height of his excitation comes the fiend, the punishing superego, and disturbs him.

It was suggested by Géza Róheim* that Mr. Dimmesdale was defying the world—he stands on the scaffold in the middle of the market place, united with his family. It is of interest that he dropped a glove. Up to the end of the 19th century, a challenge to a duel was accompanied by throwing a glove.

It is interesting to note the resemblances of *The Scarlet Letter* to Sophocle's *Oedipus Rex*.

In both works, the action is concerned with "finding the culprit" rather than with the passion and love of the protagonists.

In both works, the "culprit" is also the judge. As Hanns

*In a personal communication.

Sachs (8, p.) said, "Oedipus Tyrannus is the prototype and probably the earliest one of man who judges himself."

In *The Scarlet Letter*, as in *Oedipus Rex*, the audience is led to recognize the culprit by a gradual unfolding of evidence.

The tragic aspects are evident in both works. The fates have decided and there is nothing that can be done to avert their decision. The tragic aspects of *The Scarlet Letter* are aptly capsuled by Van Doren (2, p. 152) "Sin for him (Hawthorne), for Hester, and for the people who punish her is equally a solemn fact, a problem for which there is no solution in life. There was no other solution for his story, given Hester's strength, Dimmesdale's weakness, and Chillingworth's perversion, than the one he found. Rather, as we read, it finds itself." This is the true meaning of tragedy as the Greek tragedy is explained by Kitto. "Great tragedy," says Kitto, "is real determinism, the forerunner of scientific method. Given the ingredients, the result is inevitable.

It is of interest to note that Hawthorne places his own tragedy in the surroundings of a celebration—a pageant—the same setting in which the Greek tragedies were presented during the festivals for Dionysus. From the analytic point of view, the tragedy and the fates represent the superego.

Henry James (1, p.) recognized that *The Scarlet Letter* is not a novel of passion or love in the manner of modern novels. It is something more. It is more comparable to the tragedy of the Greeks. Actually he compares it with another novel, which has almost exactly the same plot: "I was made to feel this want of reality, this overingenuity of *The Scarlet Letter* by chancing upon a novel which was read fifty years ago much more than today: The story of *Adam Blair* by John Gibson Lockhart. . . . *Adam Blair* is the history of passion; *The Scarlet Letter* is its sequel. . . . It (*Adam Blair*) threw into relief the passionless quality of Hawthorne's novel, its element of cold and ingenious fantasy, its elaborate, imaginative delicacy."

Up to this point, it has been shown that:

1. *The Scarlet Letter* was written during great emotional stress. Hawthorne could not have written it before his mother died.

2. The theme of the novel is a typical oedipal situation.

3. The oedipal situation was never fully resolved in Hawthorne as his father died when he was four years old.

4. There is a great similarity in the structure of *The Scarlet Letter* with Sophocle's *Oedipus Rex*.

Oral Aspects of Hawthorne's Personality

A careful study of Hawthorne's life reveals marked oral aspects of his personality. Consider some of his characteristics which are agreed upon by all his biographers:

His desire for favors. Stewart, who attempted to minimize this aspect of Hawthorne's personality, still could not deny that Hawthorne tried to obtain as many favors from people as possible. Van Doren (2, p. 56) says: "He serenely accepted, as he serenely demanded the innumerable favors done for him. Nobody minded helping him." His penchant for asking favors is considerably more striking than in normal human experience.

The periods of depression that were an important part of his life. Concerning these, even Stewart (6, p. 3), who belittles Hawthorne's moody and depressive tendencies says: "Hawthorne inherited through his father a moodiness. He had a reputation for melancholia and a tendency towards solitude."

The dependency upon his mother and his sisters, and later his wife. The outstanding manifestation of this was in the 13-year-period he spent at home, doing nothing, depending entirely upon his mother and sisters for help. In describing Hawthorne's 13 years of solitude, Van Doren (2, p. 28) says: "Elizabeth and Louisa, and doubtless Madame Hawthorne seem to have been respectful of the regimen Hawthorne had imposed upon himself. Elizabeth, indeed, reports that "we were in those days almost absolutely obedient to him." He was always to be skillful in making others contribute to

his comfort, and this without losing any of their love. "His habits," says Elizabeth, "were as regular as possible. In the evening after tea he went out for about an hour, whatever the weather was; and in winter, after his return, he ate a pint bowl of thick chocolate . . . crumbed full of bread."

All the women in Hawthorne's stories are strong, resolute characters. He must have had a need for a supporting, a giving mother. This, of course, describes Hester of *The Scarlet Letter*. His vision of the ideal mother as a giving mother is one of the oral aspects of his personality.

He had accumulated a great deal of material but he wrote very little until *The Scarlet Letter* was written. His accumulation or "taking" was definitely more than his "giving."

In his student days, he was afraid to talk and received poor grades and fines for not declaiming, but later when he was a consul in England, he made many speeches and was not afraid to talk, and was even on occasion a good speaker (Van Doren 2, p. 18)

What frightened him? Was it not fear of his oral aggression?

Marjorie Brierly (11, p. 271) says: "We are not yet in a position to assume that all creative artists are manic depressives, but evidence is accumulating that creative art may be a most favored form of manic depressive sublimation and 'reinstatement of the ideal.'" Hawthorne's personality structure may be an additional bit of evidence in favor of the oral depressed or manic depressive personality structure of creative artists.

The Characters of "The Scarlet Letter"

As Representations of Hawthorne's Personality

One of the mechanisms used in creative work may be described as the opposite of condensation. According to Marie Monaparte (9, p. 650), this type of psychic process manifests itself even more frequently in creative writing than in dreams. This is a process by which one individual is split into several. Ernest Kris (10, p. 506) expressed it

by saying "Some great artists seem to be equally close to several of their characters and may feel many of them as parts of themselves." This process is very clearly seen in *The Scarlet Letter*. *The Scarlett Letter* has four main characters, namely, Hester, Dimmesdale, Chillingworth, and Pearl. Study of their personalities strongly suggests that these are merely aspects of one personality, Hawthorne's.

Dimmesdale

The weak ego of Dimmesdale is clearly described by Hawthorne in telling of the actions of this man. It is a description of a morbid personality, or an ego that cannot maintain itself and is unable to control the id impulses which strive to come up to the surface. The minister cannot control his feelings of guilt and he "walks as if in a maze" and all types of impulses come up to his mind. "At every step he was incited to do some strange, wild, wicked thing or other, with a sense that it would be at once involuntary and intentional, in spite of himself, yet growing out of a profounder self than that which opposed the impulse. For instance, he met one of his own deacons. . . . It was only by the most careful self-control that the former could refrain from uttering certain blasphemous suggestions that rose into his mind, respecting the Communion Supper. Again, another incident of the same nature. Hurrying along the street, the Reverend Mr. Dimmesdale encountered the eldest female member of his church, a most pious and exemplary old dame, poor widowed, lonely, And since Mr. Dimmesdale had taken her in charge, the good grandam's chief earthly comfort was to meet her pastor, whether casually or of set purpose, and he refreshed with a word of warm, fragrant, heaven-breathing Gospel truth from his beloved lips, into her dulled but rapturously attentive ear. But on this occasion, up to the moment of putting his lips to the old woman's ear, Mr. Dimmesdale, as the great enemy of souls' would have it, could recall no text of Scripture, nor aught else, except a brief, pithy, and, as it then appeared to him unanswerable argument against the immortality of the human soul.

"Again, a third instance. After parting from the old church-member, he met the youngest sister of them all. It was a maiden newly won. . . As she drew nigh, the arch-fiend whispered him to condense into small compass, and drop into her bosom a germ of evil that would be sure to blossom darkly soon, and bear black fruit betimes."

"Before the minister had time to celebrate his victory over this last temptation, he was conscious of another impulse . . . it was to stop short in the road, and teach some very wicked words to a knot of little Puritan children who were playing there, and had but just begun to talk. Denying himself this freak, as unworthy of his cloth, he met a drunken seaman, one of the ship's crew from the Spanish Main. And here, since he had so valiantly forborne all other wickedness, poor Mr. Dimmesdale longed at least to shake hands with the tarry blackguard, and recreate himself with a few improper jests, such as dissolute sailors so abound with, and a volley of good, round, solid, satisfactory, and heaven-defying oaths!" He is conscious of his temptation and feels powerless to control the anti-social impulses that come to the surface. "What is it that haunts and tempts me thus?" cried the minister to himself. "Am I mad? or am I given over utterly to the fiend?"

The deep depression, the dependency upon Hester, and his extreme guilt feelings clearly indicate the oral aspects of Dimmesdale's character, which is also Hawthorne's. Hawthorne, too, was often depressed and had many feelings of guilt coupled with an inability to accomplish anything.

Chillingworth

The monster, Chillingworth, represents Hawthorne's torturing, tormenting, cruel superego. Some occurrences in Hawthorne's early life explain the cruelty of his superego. We know that Hawthorne's father died when Hawthorne was four. And even during the first four years of Hawthorne's life, his father was away from home most of the time. Hawthorne did not have a chance to live with his father and enjoy the positive and loving aspects of him. It

is reasonable to postulate that his picture of his father was based on the perspective of the preoedipal level, a state of affairs which would be expected to result in a very punishing and frightening superego. This agrees with Melanie Klein's description of the formation of the superego in the preoedipal stage. Brierly (11, p. 37) describes the formation of the superego according to Klein by saying "Klein holds that a control of aggression by turning against the self dates not from the passing of the oedipus complex, but from the earliest fantasy incorporations. The incorporated object at once assumes the functions of the superego. The so-called cruelty of the early superego is to be ascribed to the fact that the object introjected is an image of the real object distorted by the child's hatred of it." Actually, in the introduction to *The Scarlet Letter*, Hawthorne seems to point exactly at the source of his punishing superego when he says "The figure of the first ancestor still haunts me."

Róheim (12, p. 41) says in connection with the development of the pre-oedipal superego: "Primitive forerunner of the true superego also plays a part where the authority which punishes the oedipus wishes, being usually a female cannibalistic demon to the girl and a male demon to the boy. Such a concept is only a forerunner of the true superego because its character is solely determined by the infant's aggressiveness and is independent of the parent's real attitude."

Róheim says (12, p. 41) "We were hardly aware in seeking in the primal scene the source of all belief in demons." Chillingworth is clearly a demon.

Pearl

The elfish, wild, uncivilized Pearl, too, is an aspect of Hawthorne's own instinctive urges. She is the id personified. Van Doren (2, p. 159) says: "She may even be the devil's child. Something sinister in her, something unpredictable. . . 'She is never graceful or beautiful, except when perfectly quiet. Violence—exhibitions of passion—strong expressions of any kind—destroy her beauty. . . . She plays, sits down

on the floor, and complains grievously of warmth. This is the physical manifestation of the evil spirit that struggles for the mastery of her; he is not a spirit at all, but an earthly monster, who lays his grasp on her spinal marrow, her brain, and other parts of her body that lie in closest contiguity to her soul. . . . There is something that almost frightens me about the child—I know not whether elfish or angelic, but at all events, supernatural. . . . She shrinks from nothing, has such a comprehension of everything, seems at times to have but little delicacy, and anon shows that she possesses the finest essence of it; now so hard, now so tender; now so perfectly unreasonable, soon again so wise. In short, I now and then catch an aspect of her in which I cannot believe her to be my own human child, but a spirit strangely mingled with good and evil, haunting the house where I dwell."

Hawthorne's Motivations

What is the aim of the book—why did he write it? The answer to this may be found in the last few lines of the book: "And, after many, many years, a new grave was delved, near an old and sunken one, in that burial ground beside which King's Chapel has since been built. It was near that that old and sunken grave (but even then he did not dare to be close to her, yet with a space between, as if the dust of the two sleepers had no right to mingle." It was his aim that finally he and his mother should be completely reunited.

Edmund Bergler says: ". . . the artist identifies himself with the giving mother, out of aggression towards her and thus eliminates her. He achieves oral pleasures for himself through 'beautiful' words and ideas. In its deepest sense, it is a desire to refute the 'bad' pre-oedipal mother and the disappointments experienced through her, establishing an 'autarchy.'" (13, p. 260)

An analysis of the character of Hester Prynne, coupled with a knowledge of Hawthorne's life, clearly shows that Hester is his mother ideal. The best description of Hester is given by Van Doren (2, p. 154) "He (Dimmesdale) is re-

deemed for us only because his suffering makes him beautiful and because Hester continues to love him. He would be fantastic—he would be one of Hawthorne's figments—had she not loved him in the first place. We believe this because we believe everything about her and understand how much distinction she gives the objects of her love. The explanation of her superior strength, which never shows itself more clearly than when 'with sudden and desperate tenderness' she throws her arms around him in the forest, is not merely that she has had the comparative luck to live in popular shame. We are convinced that she would have been strong in any case with the wisdom not to pervert either herself or him. As always with Hawthorne's women, she has more courage than the man with whom her lot is joined. . . Hawthorne unearthed the image of a goddess supreme in beauty and power and this included, whether he planned it or not, erotic power," in other words, the completely ideal mother. Hawthorne had a personality structure with a weak ego, an extremely punishing superego, and very violent libidinal urges. This being the case, what choice did he have but to attempt to find surcease through his mother.

30 West 72nd St.
New York 23, N.Y.

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From Immanuel Kant's Self-Analysis

by
Richard D. Loewenberg, M.D.

" . . . We are in urgent need of a philosophical treatment of these psychological medical issues. Kindly let me have your treatise for my *Journal of Practical Medicine* . . ."
—(Sept. 30, 1797—Hufeland in a letter to Kant).(1A)

I

REASON ON TRIAL IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In previous papers (1 & 2) I tried to show how some of the best minds of the period of "Enlightenment" wrestled with the basic principles of psychosomatics. The present study seeks to show how critical methods (though no longer so popular) recognized and struggled with these same problems which face us today in our daily clinical work.

Kant's famous "Critique of Pure Reason," begins with the statement that "all our knowledge begins with experience, of that there can be no doubt." Coming from a craftsman's family of the pietistic sect, as so many thinkers of the Enlightenment, he continued his self-analysis throughout his life. These days, introspective psychology is held in low esteem, though even Pavlov never denied its value!

While the complete denial of any need for clear methodological procedure has brought introspection into such disrepute, it is significant to study the strict and critical methods with which one of the most brilliant minds in history approached these problems. The changed terminology should not confuse us: Our ill-defined mental hygiene was then called "mental dietetics", or still more honest and precise the "art of prolonging life," and our introspection was called self-observation and self-reflection, still good expressive

terms. Scattered throughout Kant's writings we find fragments of his self-analysis, with which this study is mainly concerned.

Schopenhauer, comparing Kant's main writings to the effect of removing a cataract, regarded them as the most important event in "the two thousand years of the history of philosophy". His place in the history of philosophy is unshaken. His insistence on the limitations of knowledge, his anticipation of Darwin's evolutionary ideas and today's cosmological theories have become a part of the history of mankind, that should not forget his forceful advocacy of international law and order in a universal federation of states. (Benda (3) and Friedrich (4)). How modern physicists, contrary to the medical profession, are preoccupied with problems of knowledge is well known. Not incidentally, Kant concentrated on medical and natural science problems as his point of departure. K. R. Popper (5), in a recent profound study, took Kant as an example for his thesis: The nature of philosophical problems can be understood only from the urgent scientific problems of the period. Newton's theory and the French Revolution determined Kant's thinking. The author does not touch Kant's own biological and medical problems as they are reflected in his work. It is believed Kant's thoughts on medicine and his own personality are of the greatest interest. Some of his observations throw light on his acute analytic capacity and his full awareness of psychosomatic relations as affecting his own life: "Pain is the spur and prod of all activity and in it, first of all, we feel our life." (6)

My comments are intended merely as spadework to a future pathography of Kant, of whose declining years we have rather detailed observations by E. A. Chr. Wasianski. (7) This model personality, known throughout his life for his rigid daily routine and zeal for moderation, showed in his later years all the symptoms of a senile dementia, haunted by nightmares and fears; doubly tragic, for his was one of the most luminous minds in history. The abundant philo-

sophical literature on Kant largely ignores this particular aspect of his life.

II

KANT'S PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSERVATIONS

His "Essay on Diseases of the Head" (1764) written in the philosophical style of his time, shows his intense interest in psycho-pathological problems. He wrote it as a comment on a fantastic, half-insane, new "Diogenes" (who made his spectacular appearance around Koenigsberg during this year). The essay illustrates the old German University tradition in which philosophy and psychology were represented by the same faculty. Was this always to the detriment of science? Perhaps we are inclined to believe so, for in these days, we live behind Chinese walls of extreme specialization.

While there are no startling revelations in Kant's reflections, a few sentences might give an idea of how close he was to very modern insights, it also reveals his little-suspected humorous vein, not uncommon in hypochondriac self-observers:

(Kant's Werke, P. 262) (8): "Who is without foolishness is a sage. This sage may be searched for, perhaps, in the moon. Perchance there is one there, without passion, and who has infinite reason."

(P. 264): "One has no cause to believe, that in the state of being awake our minds follow other laws than during sleep. Supposedly in the first case (of waking) the lively sense impressions make obscure and unrecognizable the more delicate images of the chimerical fancies, whereas these have their full strength in sleep, in which all external impressions find the entrance closed to the mind. . . . (P. 265): Therefore, the insane is but a dreamer awake."

Kant's decisive works began to appear at the age when most men consider their creative life finished. Carl J. Friedrich (4) points out that another modern philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (Locke and Reid likewise) published his first major work near sixty. Even Freud's first pioneering work,

the "Interpretations of Dreams" (1900) was published in his forty-fourth year, ten years after he had complained in his letters to Fliess that he considered his scientific life as ended. Both these analytical giants, Kant and Freud, expressed their indifference to music (which Plato long ago banned from his utopian republic). Curiously, Kant, the perennial bachelor, saw a relationship between his lack of musical appreciation and his lack of enjoyment of the beauties of style and the fascinations of love. The sense of smell, though praised by the Greek philosophers, he considered most ungratifying and dispensable.

Of special interest are some of Kant's neurological observations reporting on his visual disturbances. Contrary to the accepted idea of the asthenic scholar in the ivory tower, his visual memory and imagination about objects of which he had only read, were greatly admired by his contemporaries. The following passage is taken from the third chapter of "Dispute of the Philosophical With the Medical Faculty", discussing the ability of the mind "to master sick feelings through the mere resolution." The essay is a reply to Professor Hufeland's book, "The Art of Prolonging the Human Life". He states in a post script (9): "My first experience of a pathological (functional) eye condition (not exactly eye disease) occurred in my forties, and later recurred in intervals of a few years, now and then. At present, it happens several times in one year. What happens is: On the page I am reading, all letters are suddenly confused and mixed with a certain diffuse brightness to the point of utter illegibility. This does not last over six minutes, which might be rather dangerous to a preacher who is accustomed to reading his sermon; however, in my case, while lecturing extemporaneously on logic metaphysics (after appropriate preparation) my only concern was that this incident might be the omen of oncoming blindness. Although I am now reassured about it, I did not notice the slightest reduction in clarity in my healthy right eye, as these episodes became more frequent. My left eye lost its vision about five years ago. By chance,

it occurred to me, when that phenomenon happened, to close my eye, by covering it with my hand to keep out the external light. Then I saw a bright, white figure as though being drawn with phosphorous on a page, similar to the last quarter of the moon as it is illustrated on the calendar, but with a margin zig-zagged on the convex side, which gradually lost brightness and disappeared at the time mentioned above. I would like to know whether similar experiences have been noted by others and how this apparition might be explained: It is not really in the eyes, because this image does not move simultaneously with their movements, but it is always seen in the same location and might have its location in the sensorium commune. Besides, it is peculiar that one can lose the sight of one eye within a period (which I estimate to be) around three years without being aware of the loss." His faithful friend and attendant of his last years, Wasianski (7) reports on the visual disturbances, which might have been an ophthalmic migraine, retinal hemorrhages, or later an optic atrophy: "In the beginning of autumn, the sight of his right eye began to fail him; he had long ago lost the use of his left eye. This earliest loss of vision, he had discovered by mere accident. Sitting down one day to rest himself in the course of a walk, it occurred to him that he would try the comparative strength of his eyes. On taking out a newspaper which he had in his pocket, he was surprised to find that with his left eye he could not distinguish a letter. Earlier in life he had two remarkable affections of the eyes: once, on returning from a walk, he saw objects double for a long space of time: and twice he became stone-blind. Whether these accidents are to be considered as uncommon, I leave to the decision of oculists. They certainly caused Kant very little disturbance. Until old age had lowered the tone of his powers, he lived in a constant state of stoical preparation for the worst that could befall him."

Kant's emphasis on reason showed he was fully aware of the influence of his attitude on himself, even when he

withdraws behind general observations as this from his Reflections in his "Anthropology" (9):

"The internal sensitivity, while being touched by our own reflections, is harmful. *Analysts easily become sick.*"* He remarks on free association as follows (P. 153): "It is well worth and necessary for logic and metaphysics to think about the different acts of imagination within me when I evoke them." He speculates on his own constitution, not unlike other similarly affected contemporary philosophers (Lichtenberg, Mendelssohn, Lessing) as follows: "On account of my narrow and flat chest that leaves little free space for the movement of the heart and lung, I have a natural disposition to hypochondria, which bordered in former years on being tired of living. But the consideration that the cause of this heart oppression is perhaps merely mechanical, and not to be abolished, resulted soon in my ignoring it completely. While I felt oppressed in the chest, calmness and cheerfulness took over in my head . . . The oppression remained, for its cause lies in my body build. But I became master over its influence on my thoughts and actions by diverting my attention from these sensations as though they did not concern me at all."

It would be very tempting to enumerate some other of Kant's occasional psychological remarks: He pointed to the curious fact that congenially married couples grow to have a similar cast of features, anticipating, as Allport (10) observed, "The role of the unconscious imitation of expression." Kant's lifelong preoccupation with the problem of character (11) will not be easily understood because this term has been degraded in this country to the low level of "quite a funny character", contrary to the continental usage. He recognized the physiological and psychological aspects of personality (as we like to call them today) and tried to sketch the different characters of various nations, although he never left his home town. In his Anthropology he tried

*(Italics are mine)

to explain the sobriety of women, ministers, and Jews sociologically, in that the weak social position of exposed separatistic sectarians impelled to greater self-control. Margetts (22) quotes from Section 5 of the Anthropology, Kant's clear concept of the "obscure" ideas of the unconscious: "Innumerable are the sensations and perceptions *whereof we are not conscious* That only a few spots on the great chart of our minds are illuminated may well fill us with amazement in contemplating this nature of ours."

III

THE REVOLUTIONARY SAGE

Kant's physically weak constitution sympathized with the revolutionary fights of his age. This courageous citizen who avoided attending church held most progressive and liberal opinions about the American and French Revolutions at a time when it was dangerous to hold them, when black lists of suspected "Jacobins" were quite common. His enthusiastic defense of the American cause estranged him temporarily from his intimate English friend, Green (Abbot). (12) His insistence on freedom is particularly striking, coming from a mind tyrannizing itself with the utmost discipline. He said about children as well as adults: "There can be nothing more dreadful than that the actions of a man should be subject to the will of another." His former pupils were among the first to abolish selfdom on their estates. (Benda (3)) In 1794, when he was seventy years old, he was reprimanded by a secret Royal Cabinet order for distorting and degrading many principal and basic doctrines of Holy Whit and Christianity. A year later his treatise "Towards Eternal Peace" was published, summoning the warring nations to form a "special form of alliance that might be called a 'league of peace': We cannot divide ourselves between right and expediency. Policy must bow the knee before morality."

I shall resist the temptation to venture into the dynamics of this great thinker about whom we have still only fragmentary knowledge, confining myself merely to some spadework for future workers in this little cultivated field. Phyllis

Greenacre's (13) study on the close relationship of "Vision, Headache and the Halo" might be remembered: The extremely developed superego, the exalted adoration of the mother, the scintillating scotoma of ophthalmic migraine symptoms suggest, even in the absence of early childhood memories, a similar constellation in an intellect who recognized time, space and causality as a halo, supplied by the mind to a denying nature.

It might be mentioned in passing, however, that his contemporaries already were looking for some of the constitutional roots of his philosophy. His much less known, but not less profound friend, the physicist and philosopher, Lichtenberg (2) with whom Kant often corresponded and whom he requested to review his works on the *Metaphysical Elements of Natural science*, remarked in his aphorisms (off the record): "Should not something of which Herr Kant teaches, especially in regard to the moral law, be a consequence of his (old) age, when passion and opinions lose their strength and reason alone remains?"

The remark in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (eleventh edition) that: "He was somewhat deficient in the region of sentiment," appears rather strange when we remember that he was moved to tears when he spoke of his mother, and was deeply attached to his students in a way like the fatherly Socrates. (Gomperz) (14). He was so overwhelmed by the reading of Rousseau that he broke the precise schedule of his daily working routine, which had been compared by a biographer to the most regular of regular verbs. The combination of analytical reasoning with religious enthusiasm and fascination in mystical experiences and hypochondriac superstitions comes out clearly in Kant's comments of 1766 on "Dreams of a Visionary explained by dreams of metaphysics". The same combination is shown by Lichtenberg confessing his secret superstitions to Kant, a Freudian "symptom" deserving a special examination. Santayana remarked that "Kant, like Berkeley, had a private mysticism in reserve to raise upon the ruins of science and common-

sense." Kant's own very serious remarks on his practice of breathing through the nose instead of through the mouth, which caused him to take his daily walks alone, indicates the closeness of health superstitions to rationalizing reflections. In our days, the vitamin fads, the dietetic cults, and the psychologistic movements confirm the same trend.

In his principles of (mental) dietetics, Kant calls the hypochondriac a self-torturer whose poetic imagination is affected by the impending evil of illness. He speaks clearly: "Moreover, philosophizing (without ever being a philosopher) is also a means of *defense* (italics are ours) of many disagreeable feelings. At the same time, it is an agitation of the mind; its occupation provides an interest which is independent from internal incidents; therefore, although only as a play, it is nevertheless strong and intense and does not let the vital forces cease." At another time he stressed that all changes frightened him. Was that one of the reasons why he five times declined tempting calls to other universities?

This wavering and indecision contributed to his missing two potential opportunities for marriage. His relationship to his sisters and brother was rather detached and cool, although he supported them in later life.—(Klinke (21)

The following remarkable manifestation of compulsive anxiety is described by Herzberg (15): "When, for example, his servant once broke a wineglass, he asked that the splinters should be buried so that nobody might be cut by them. He did not, however, venture to entrust the task to his servant but asked his guests to perform it. So they went out into the garden and looked for a sufficiently unfrequented spot. Kant, however, objected to every proposal on the ground that someone might hurt himself, until at length a spot was found by the side of an old wall and a deep hole dug in which the splinters were carefully buried in their presence."

While in Kant's later years the rigid fortification against fears and anxieties completely broke down, his character preserved its strength even under the overwhelming brain disease of a progressive senile dementia during his

last years. Previously, his deep seated fears were only occasionally visible under the shell of stoic attitudes. Throughout his life "he could not bear to visit his friends in sickness, and after their death he repressed all allusion to their memory" — (*Encyclopedia Britannica*) (16). But at the end of his life, these self-erected dams of defense collapsed. The details of the last tragic phase of his life have been described faithfully by Wasianski (7) (P. 964):

"His horrible dreams became more terrifying; single scenes, or passages in these dreams, were sufficient to compose the whole course of mighty tragedies, the after-effect being so profound as to stretch far into his waking hours. Among other phantasmata more shocking and indescribable, his dreams constantly represented to him the forms of murderers advancing to his bedside; and so agitated was he by the awful trains of phantoms that swept past him nightly, that in the first confusion of awaking he generally mistook his servant, who was hurrying to his assistance, for a murderer. In the daytime we often conversed upon these shadowy illusions; and Kant, with his usual spirit of stoical contempt for nervous weakness of every sort, laughed at them; and, to fortify his own resolution to contend against them, he wrote down in his memorandum-book, 'There must not take place any more of these nightly flights of fancy.'"

How even through the regression of organic deterioration, remnants of his highest spirits were preserved, is shown in another moving episode, recorded by Wasianski. It characterizes his peculiar kind of speech disturbance and its fluctuations, that resist any clear cut classification, although it might have approached what we call now a partial nominal aphasia. "When the physician was announced, I went up to Kant and said to him, 'Here is Dr. A—.' Kant rose from his chair, and, offering his hand to the doctor, murmured something in which the word 'posts' was frequently repeated, but with an air as though he wished to be helped out with the rest of the sentence. Dr. A—, who thought that, by posts, he meant the stations for relays of post-horses, and therefore

that his mind was wandering, replied that all the horses were engaged, and begged him to compose himself. But Kant went on, with great effort to himself, and added, 'Many posts, heavy posts—then much goodness—then much gratitude.' All this he said with apparent incoherence, but with great warmth, and increasing self-possession. I, in the meantime grasped clearly what it was that Kant, under his cloud of imbecility, wished to say, and interpreted accordingly. 'What the professor wishes to say, Dr. A—, is this, that, considering the many and weighty posts which you fill in the city and in the university, it tokens great goodness on your part to give up so much of your time to him' (for Dr. A— would never take any fees from Kant) 'and that he has the deepest regard for this goodness.' Right,' said Kant, earnestly—'right!' But he still continued to stand, and was nearly sinking to the ground. Upon which I remarked to the physician, that I was convinced that Kant would not sit down, however much he suffered from standing, until he knew that his visitors were seated. The doctor seemed to doubt this; but Kant, who heard what I said, by a prodigious effort confirmed my interpretation of his conduct, and spoke distinctly these words—'God forbid I should sink so low, the feeling for humanity has not yet left me. . . .'

IV

FREUD AND KANT

In passing, we note the quite Freudian term "defense" (*Abwehr*) and we may, with better knowledge of Freud's earlier years, wonder how much his own inner experiences contributed to these reflections. The earlier impatient outbursts and ambivalence about philosophy must have deeper than logical reasons: A century before Freud, the "Trial of Reason" was mercilessly begun by Kant: Both were searching for the universal denominator of human emotions.

From Bernfeld's (17) study, we know that Freud registered between 1874 and 1876 for the non-obligatory classes in philosophy of Franz Brentano (1838-1917). Brentano's "act" theories of the emotional background of judgment and

the connection of consciousness with self-observation was perhaps not entirely without influence on the founder of psychoanalysis. As a part of the cultural atmosphere of the nineteenth century, references to Kant are occasionally found in Freud's earliest and latest writings, from the "Interpretation of Dreams", to the posthumous notes. We find two entries at the end of the seventeenth volume of Freud's (18) *Gesammelte Werke*: They are significant remarks dated August 22, 1938, dealing with Mystic and Kant. "August 22, 1938: (The quality of) space may be the projection of the extension of the psychical apparatus. No other derivation (is) likely. Instead of Kant's apriori conditions of our psychical apparatus—psyche is extensive, without knowing it."

(Same date): "Mystic, the dark self-perception of the realm outside the Ego, the Id." There is no better evidence of Freud's continuous deep interest in philosophical issues throughout his life. His emphasis that he avoided reading Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in order to preserve unbiased observations, makes us wonder, since the spiritual atmosphere of these two revolutionary thinkers was inescapable at the turn of the century.

V

THE SUBJECTION TO REASON

Without presuming to offer something novel, I have sought to make clear that the stereotyped picture of this great philosopher, judged from his outside rigid appearance and exemplary conduct, needs much more critical study for a deeper understanding. To interpret the moral law within and the starry heaven above as a projected fear of conscience and inescapable punishment from which Kant was hiding (as Rado (19) does), is too facile. One must agree with Popper, we cannot afford to ignore that Kant's ideas throughout his life, were determined by Newton's dynamics of the heavens and the ideas of Rousseau and the French Revolution. The comfortable diagnostic label of compulsive schizoid character neurosis hardly reaches the depth of his tragic

destiny. Grotjahn (20) offered a possible fascinating explanation for some cases of senile dementia. He sees in them a defense against reactivated infantile castration anxiety: "It seems that the id does not participate in the process of growing up." Genius survives too often in the distortions of a cartoon: Kant's continued influence on history and mankind (as in the case of Copernicus, Calvin, or even Freud) has deviated radically from that which he sought to have. He cannot be made responsible for the abuses committed in his name. Freud's warning has been often forgotten, that psychological determination of a doctrine by no means rules out its scientific correctness. Kant's work started from the scientific problems of his age, reflecting the pattern of his own nature.

We see at times an overlapping of the philosophic and poetic creativity from Plato to Santayana. Kant also, at times, tested himself in trivial occasional verses. On the death of the pastor who had married his parents, he wrote these lines:

"Deep darkness hides our after life, forever unknown:
What we are expected to do, that we know alone."

Only rarely do we have the tragic spectacle of an heroic life interpreting so eloquently its own existence as Kant did. The inarticulate muteness of the daily tragedies around us are illumined by the merciless self-dissection of his unique mind.

One of Kant's earliest essays was written in 1746 (at the age of 22) on "Thoughts on the True Evaluation of Living Forces". Fifteen years later, still in his pre-critical era, he published his "Observations on the Sense of the Beautiful and Sublime," which Bertrand Russell condescendingly ridiculed. We find a very remarkable sentence there, however, that already sums up his own existence: "In the human nature, we never find commendable qualities, without at the same time their deviations, which pass over through infinite shades into extreme imperfection." But this merciless recognition is supplemented by his famous formula which in his

ruthless humanity made him one of the trail-blazers of mankind: Wasianski reports that Kant's uncanny awareness of his lifeline (sometimes visible in his crossed-out signature) found nearly the same expression in his own words, within a span of sixty years. At the age of 22 he wrote: "I have already fixed upon the line which I am resolved to keep. I will enter on my course and nothing shall prevent me from pursuing it." And the eighty year old sage spoke of himself (as Wasianski reports) as "under the figure of a gymnastic artist who had continued for nearly fourscore years to support his balance upon the tightrope of life, without once swerving to the right or to the left."

But the secret of Kant's unique creativity is beyond any analysis. Many thinkers in the Enlightenment were stirred by the implications of Newton's dynamics of the heavens and the French Revolution; many others were reared in the pietistic tradition and lived a dedicated life to the dictates of their conscience, but there was only one Kant in his and any other age. The final passage of the Critique of Practical Reason sums up his ideas on the perennial mission of philosophy and life (Friedrich's translation): "In a word, scientific knowledge, critically explored and systematically introduced, is the narrow gateway which leads to *wisdom*, if by such wisdom is understood not merely what one ought to *do*, but what ought to serve as a guide for *teachers*, in order to find well and clearly the paths to wisdom on which every man ought to tread, and to preserve others from dead alleys. This is true knowledge, of which philosophy must remain the guardian at all times."

SUMMARY

The old, now abandoned tradition of the combined philosophical and psychological aspects remains necessary for a deeper understanding of the basic problems of psychosomatic medicine. The present study on Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) neurological self-observations continues previous investigations on psychosomatics in the eighteenth century.

Scattered throughout his writings we find numerous observations, which put together might well serve as fragments of a never intended self-analysis. New aspects of the philosopher's highly complicated character are revealed in the correlation of his self-analysis, reflections, preoccupations and superstitions, that resist today's diagnostic simplified interpretations. While the scientific and political problems of his age were the starting point of his philosophical work, his nature and personality determined the merciless pursuit of his devoted life. Some of the predominant traits that formed his character were: his extreme ideals, his lifelong adoration of his mother, the scintillating scotoma of ophthalmic migraine, and his mystic inclination and health superstitions. These patterns were not incidental, and contributed to his obsessional preoccupation with the inner workings of the mind, possibly even to the development of his organic senile dementia. Kant's early analytical insights also throw a new light on Freud's ambivalent attitude towards philosophy, concealed by his lifelong fascination in metapsychology. Even progressive senile deterioration could not completely destroy Kant's humanity, when terrifying nightmares broke down defenses of a lifetime in an emaciated body. On the grandest scale, his life unfolds what the everyday tragedies of our patients disguise. It prepares for an analysis of the character of the philosophical mind: "Every man's reason is every man's oracle". — (Bolingbroke)

238 18th St., Suite 6
Bakersfield, Cal.

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The Esthetics Of Psychoanalysis

by
Alvin Schwartz

" . . . I would think how words go straight up in a thin line, quick and harmless, and how terribly doing goes along the earth, clinging to it, so that after a while the two lines are too far apart for the same person to straddle from one to the other; and that sin and love and fear are just sounds that people who never sinned nor loved nor feared have for what they never had and cannot have until they forget the words."

—*As I Lay Dying*, William Faulkner

I

It is not a talent for insight that distinguishes the teacher of ethics, but a talent for attentiveness which enables him to guide the development of what only becomes insight at the moment of joint illumination. This is the meaning of Socratic ignorance. The pupil can only learn from the teacher when the teacher simultaneously learns from the pupil.

II

Ethical teaching begins with mere presuppositions about meaning. As in the psychoanalytic "free association", it employs given words as feelers and then waits to see what encrustations of meaning they will acquire. Thus when one says "no" to a small child, the child reacts by apparently violating the injunction. That is, he seeks to continue in the forbidden act. But this is a struggle for meaning rather than an act of defiance. The child stakes himself utterly in his exploration at every possible point of the limits of the "no". And it is required of the teacher or parent not to inhibit this "working through", but to guide it so that the word is shaped mutually and then may truly be spoken.

III

In the psychoanalytic relation, a patient will exclaim when illumination suddenly comes to him: "But you knew this all the time. How could you refrain from telling me?" But the analyst did not know, because the word had not yet been given life. What the patient thinks the analyst knew was only the form of the word, that is, its isolated technical existence. But he did not know the patient. That only occurred when both came upon the word together.

IV

The emphasis in much psychoanalytic thinking on the scientifically validated structure of insights into the mechanisms of character has led me to draw these parallels with ethical teaching. My purpose is to show that psychoanalysis cannot be regarded as a body of truth with the same significance that attaches to truth in the physical sciences, and that despite the avowals of its scientific nature, it is practically inaccessible to the analytic methodology of science. As I will show later, this is not meant to be construed as any assertion of an essential division between science and ethics.

Properly speaking, psychoanalysis in its characterological aspect is a misnomer. As *praxis*, it is not a method through which one man "analyses" another, grasps his mechanisms and then proceeds, as in medicine, to manipulate these mechanisms in order to effect a cure. It is not a body of knowledge, but an institution within whose forms and structurings education takes place. It grasps no profounder human psychology, or any ordering of it, than the great religious and ethical movements of the past. Essentially, it is a *regrasping* in contemporary forms of what the Greeks, the Hebrews and the early Christians had previously infused into our Western civilization.

In titling this paper "The Esthetics of Psychoanalysis", which is a reference to those dangers which threaten to subvert a genuine capacity for teaching, I had in mind the esthetic as that which divides or separates as opposed to the real task of synthesis, of putting things together. I

therefore propose to trace the concept of the esthetic as it was recognized in those earlier ethical formations of which modern psychoanalysis is the heir.

V

In the Old Testament, the danger of *aesthesis* as the ground of action is clearly acknowledged in the injunctions concerning idolatry. To the passage that warns against the making of graven images lest the Lord scatter the people of Israel among the nations, is added the terrifying words:

And there ye shall serve gods, the work of men's hands, wood and stone, which neither see, nor hear, nor eat, nor smell. (Deut. IV-28, italics mine)

The significance of this passage is especially crucial to my thesis. Seeing, hearing, eating and smelling are not special characteristics of the God of Israel as opposed to idols. The passage can only refer to men, and obviously means that the living way to serve God is through serving other men. This is also what lies behind the concept of the "chosen people". The Israelites are a people chosen to *become* a people by serving God through relation to one another. (1) The point of the Covenant lies in the fact that it is not a Covenant with each individual Hebrew but with the whole people. This prohibition against the making of any likeness, this anti-esthetic concept of the Hebrews reflects a profound understanding of the laws of life.

The threat to existence in the category of the esthetic lies in the constant possibility of the sense of beauty or the idea of the true being taken for the truth itself, as in the case of the patient cited above. The invisible God is an acknowledgment that truth and beauty do not inhere in things, but arise out of a specific relation to things. This qualification is equally made by the Greeks and the early Christians, although the manner of its expression differs according to the character of the different historical instances that projected it.

In addition to Plato's familiar exclusion of the poets from his Republic, there are his consistent reprobations of

the work of art conceived as a mere "copy of a copy". (Republic X, Sophist 265, Timaeus 29) But long before Plato, the Greeks were aware of this. In touching on an analogous problem, Kant, in a footnote to his "Religion Within The Limits of Reason Alone", reminds us that "only after vanquishing monsters did Hercules become Musagetes, leader of the Muses, after labors from which those worthy sisters, trembling, draw back."

For the Greeks, the distinction was sharply drawn between the realm of artistic (and/or religious) experience and the realm of the esthetic. Thus, to Plato, even physics would fall under the category of the esthetic if it were regarded as truth, or in the *misunderstood* modern sense, as possessing an exact truth to which we can constantly approximate. (2) It is by subsuming physics under the category of art that Plato rescues it from the esthetic, just as he also rescues art from the esthetic by relating it to the sacred. His whole cosmological construct was carefully qualified as a kind of poem, "a likely story," i.e., something like the truth, but not the truth itself. (3)

To grasp this distinction more fully, the question may now be put to the Old Testament Hebrews: "Why a Covenant with the whole people?" Or more specifically: "How does the individual enter into this Covenant?"

The answer lies in the fact that the individual as individual comes into being only through an awareness of "the other", that is, the other man to whom he is bound through the Covenant with the people. This "otherness", however, has to be Absolute otherness, which means finally, the idea of God.

This same idea is expressed by V. Solovyev, by means of an extension of the psychological category of abnormality. In discussing fetishism, he writes that the abnormality consists obviously

... in the part being put in place of the whole, the attribute in the place of the substance. But if what excites the fetish-worshipper, the hair or the feet, are only parts of the woman's

body, then this same body, in its whole structure, is only a part of the woman's being. Nevertheless the numerous lovers of the woman's body, in and for itself, are not termed fetish-worshippers, do not acknowledge themselves to be insane and do not submit to treatment of any kind. In what however does the difference lie here? It cannot surely lie in the fact that the hand or the foot represents a smaller surface than the whole body?

If . . . those sexual relations are abnormal in which the part is put in place of the whole, then those people, who in this way or otherwise purchase a woman's body for the satisfaction of an emotional need, and by so doing separate body from soul, must be acknowledged abnormal in sexual relations . . . or even worshippers of carrion. (The Meaning of Love, p. 49, trans. Jane Marshall, The Centenary Press, London 1945) (4)

Thus the awareness of "the other" cannot be relative without being fantastic. For the relative entirely deprives the individual of the capacity for genuine action. Not he himself but some separate image of himself would be acting, for he would have to *leap* into action without coming to any real decision, in the hope that the act itself would define him. (5) Now this leaping from one act to another is nothing more than discontinuity. There is never any decision and so never any self. Goethe's Mephistopheles illustrates this profoundly. The devil is he who leaps. He is the sudden, the absolutely discontinuous.

To further clarify this inadequacy of the relative, it can be approached from the starting-point of decision. The decision to undertake that act which the moment requires always involves a risk, since, as in the parable of the good Samaritan, the consequence of the action cannot be known in advance. This risk can easily involve life itself and can therefore only be undertaken out of some ground or maxim whose source is a possibility worth more than life itself. This highest possibility cannot become actualized without faith. And with faith, the possibility becomes absolute. (6)

The emergence of the individual from the relation to the Absolutely Other is therefore the basis of the Covenant

with the whole people. Through those who see, hear, eat and smell, men may serve God, and out of this relation to other men, they achieve togetherness. They become a people and so they become individuals. As given in the Old Testament, the people in law consists of the possibility of becoming individuals in conscience. The law conceived as necessity becomes internalized as conscience or freedom.

In this way the terms "people-individual" are dialectically related. The people means the possibility of the individual and the individual the possibility of a people. But there is always the danger of one term hardening into an end in itself, thereby excluding the other. This is once more the danger of the esthetic, that is, of splitting. It transforms "people" into "state" and it loses the individual. Hence the ban on idolatry in the Law of Moses.

When such a hardening of *people* into *state* occurs, the *individual*, as the lost opposite term in the relation, seeks to be restored. In this way Christianity, as the religion of the individual, emerged from the hardening of Judaism. (7) And with the restoration of the individual, the opposite term "people" was also recreated. The same dialectical entity appeared with, however, *the historical order of the terms reversed*, so that instead of the earlier sequence, "people-individual," there emerged the order, "individual-people". The people in law who must become individuals in conscience revives in its converse form as the individual in conscience becoming the people in law. Hence the new religion takes the name of Christ as the individual Son of God (where the Hebrew faith bore the name of the people) universalizing itself into the possibility of the brotherhood of man. As before, law and conscience, or necessity and freedom, become one in possibility. This is the idea of true Being — the union of freedom and necessity.

The maxims that dictate the contemporary Western formulations of the problem of the individual (as psychology) and society (as sociology) are largely grounded in the cultural inheritance of the two terms in the relation "people-in-

dividual" as that inheritance still lives in the ideological bodies of Christianity and Judaism. The continued survival of these two bodies cannot occur singly. The one cannot maintain its existence without the presence of the other, that is, without the terms "people-individual" retaining their dialectical simultaneity. Christianity especially becomes the "guardian" of Judaism since, historically, it is the *ascendant* faith that emerged from Judaism, the terms being in the order: "Christianity-Judaism"; and it is just this historical guardianship (which does not occur for the Jews' sake) that raises for the Jews those unique problems of identity which, under the constant compulsion to inquire into their Jewishness, provides in many individual instances, the mold for neurosis. Among Christians, a complementary compulsion stems from the fact that Christianity has been compelled to guard the Jew for *its own sake*.

I say then, have they (the Jews) stumbled that they should fall? God forbid: but rather through their fall salvation is come unto the Gentiles, for to provoke them to jealousy. (Romans, XI-11)

As concerning the Gospel, they are enemies for your sakes, but as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sakes. (Ibid XI-28)

Alongside the Christian guardianship and "invention" of the Jew, there is to be found the esthetic phenomenon of anti-semitism. For anti-semitism is the consequence of the hardening of the ascendent term of the Christian dialectic. It emerges from the esthetic splitting off of the term "individual" from the term "people". The individual appears as an end in himself, that is, the hardening takes the form of self-deification through the presence of his own infinitely self-reflected image. From this standpoint, the Christian only sees in the Jew the daemonic representative of the suddenly hostile term "people" under the aspect of his intractably refusing to be anything but a people and a Jewish people at that. Thus where Christianity had previously *required* that the Jew regard himself as being of a "people",

the unchristian Christian *accuses* the Jew of so regarding himself out of his hostility to Christianity. Through these dynamics, so familiar to psychology, the Jew is finally stamped by the anti-semite as the perennial alien. (8)

In that historical sequence preceding Christianity, when the terms were expressed in the order "people-individual" and the term *individual* was under the guardianship of the ascendent Hebrew faith, it was the Gentiles who became the concrete expression of this dialectical opposition. The use of the plural is of vital importance here since the antithesis has to be precisely plurality, that is, "the peoples" as opposed to the Hebrew "people". (9) It was necessary, therefore, for the Hebrews to invent the Gentiles (peoples) even as the Christians later invented the Jew. This was why the God of Moses was "a consuming fire, even a *jealous* God." It was necessary to hold the two terms "Hebrews-Gentiles" (or "people-peoples") in their dialectical tension because only then was the possibility present to men of uniting them, so that the chosen people actually could become a people and so could become individuals. (10) And so the jealousy of the God of Israel appears as a form of divine grace. It is here, according to the Old Testament, that man's freedom is to be found. The choice is his either to break the divided Word into further fragments, or join it together so that it becomes the Name of God. So the Messiah is He Who Comes in the Name of God.

Just as the Hebrews stand at one end of Western history, in the sequence "people-individual" and look forward to the Messiah as He Who will come, so the Christians, from the other historical pole, look back on the Messiah as He Who has come. Here again history must be kept in mind as (in the Kantian sense: a modal category of conception) embracing the two ends of the possibility of eternity rather than as (in the sense of the Hegelian system) a reality in the esthetic sense. Otherwise the Messiah appears as an objective certainty rather than a possibility, and the end of such a history, since it is present by implication at any

given moment, has nothing to do with human action. To paraphrase Plato, it is merely the copy of the possibility. (11)

VI

A major confusion in the orientation of psychoanalysis is similarly reflected in the presumed antithesis of religion and science insofar as the former is regarded as an "illusion" while the latter is regarded as providing a method for arriving at the objective truth. But this attribution to a method, or even an anticipated method, of an exclusive affinity for the truth, it should be repeated, has only an esthetic-historical validity. From the point of view of the kind of truth psychoanalysis is concerned with, the premise of an essential *practical* distinction between religion and science is a misunderstanding.

Just as Christianity was a movement to restore the term "individual" which had been lost in the hardening of the Judaic "people" into "state", so science began as an attempt, *within* Christianity, to revive the original and irreducible *uniqueness* of the individual which the church of the middle-ages had lost in the theological hardening of the sacred. That is, when the church that had been the herald of God, took onto itself the character of being the repository of God's Power, it necessarily became the absolute adjudicator of God's word—as justice. This led to a rationalism in which man was defined according to general categories of justice and lost his individuality. His old equality before God and the law as recognised in practise by the visible church necessarily ruled out the hiddenness of God's mercy, or God's love as grace. For the dispensation of justice according to finite rules of equality eliminated any contradictions that might single out an individual in such a way as to upset the category of equality.

The genuinely religious, on the other hand, does not presume to know God's justice. It echoes the cry of Job: "Who shall set me a time to plead?" It judges not and confronts the other man only through the categories of love and mercy.

In the parable of the tares and the wheat, the form of the expression is man's *equality in incommensurability*. All men are morally equal since, to the finite eye, their essential inwardness, existing as it does, *sub specie aeternitatis*, is hidden.

Owe no man anything, but to love one another: for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. (Romans, XIII-8)

And so the final judgment is left to God. Thus the religious recognizes what Hamlet called "that within which passeth show." It refuses to define an individual by his situation.

In response to the theological hardening, science began as an attempt to revive the importance of ordinary things, to restore to them once again their character as irreducible entities. By withdrawing the legally imposed qualifications of good and evil, things were once more permitted their moral equality. This reversal first showed itself in art where science had its origins. As Whitehead describes it:

The first phase of medieval art has a haunting charm beyond compare: its own intrinsic quality is enhanced by the fact that its message, which stretched beyond art's own self-justification of esthetic achievement, was the symbolism of things lying beyond nature itself. In this symbolic phase, medieval art energised in nature as its medium, but pointed to another world. . . . The rise of Naturalism in the latter Middle Ages was . . . the final ingredient necessary for the rise of science. It was the rise of interest in natural objects and natural occurrences for their own sakes. The natural foliage of a district was sculptured in out-of-the-way spots of the later buildings, merely as exhibiting delight in those familiar objects . . . the simple immediate facts are the topics of interest, and these reappear in science as the 'irreducible stubborn facts'. (Science and the Modern World, P. 13ff, MacMillan 1925)

Although Whitehead errs when he speaks of the "irreducible stubborn facts", since as things *made*, facts are always reducible to their maker, if his words are altered to read "irreducible *uniqueness* of facts," which was in *fact*, the actual case with Renaissance art, it becomes clear

that the sacred was revived by way of apprehending the hidden, inscrutable order of nature directly, rather than through the old theological forms. Science, like Christianity in its beginnings, arose as an anti-rationalistic movement based on faith.

As Christian religion became rationalistic theology, so a similar tendency arises within science. Thus today's scientism interprets the laws of nature as remorseless and inevitable. The laws of causality become the decrees of fate. But this is only from the point of view that treats natural causality as a reality in the esthetic sense, so that man loses possibility and is forced to live, as Kierkegaard describes the Philistine, in the prison of probability.

But there is another side of science which has not yet lost its hold on the sacred. This, oddly enough, seems to obtain more in the realm of the physical sciences. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle clings tenaciously to natural causality as a possibility inasmuch as it leaves it to action alone to determine whether natural causality is to become fate or destiny. It was Einstein who is said to have answered a question about how he would define scientific method by urging his interlocutors not to listen to his words but to watch what he did. True science has not completely given itself over to scientism. The observer still stands existentially at the center of the universe as he did before the Copernican revolution.

In modern psychoanalysis, the problem of scientism has become crucial. Psychoanalysis as an effective factor is seriously threatened by those esthetic formulations which accept natural causality as an ultimate reality. While practice by its very nature implies an awareness of the peril, the theoretical structure cannot afford to ignore it without breaking down that social authority which currently accrues to psychoanalysis and which provides for so many the path to a desperately needed form of teaching.

The defining of the individual in terms of his aetiological limits for the sake of educating him in the meaning of choice

is a syncretistic leftover from medical theory. The problem is not one of tracing an illness back to its source and then expelling the germ. The germ in this case cannot be regarded as evil, just as things cannot in themselves be evil from the point of view of conduct. Here evil has to do with action. So neurosis as an expression of conflict over the problematics of action is that which recurrently culminates in the leap which evades decision.

In the religious sphere (in its ethical-psychological mode) the condition of remaining in sin is regarded as a new sin. And sin is despair. The dynamic characterology of despair (12) puts the emphasis not on man's conditioning but his potentiality. This expresses adequately the fact that the individual is free at any moment to turn away from sin. Since the next act offers such a possibility, he is not cast into further despair by having to regard himself as a hopeless prisoner of his past. Indeed, when a man seems to despair over his sins, it is said of him that he has already surrendered to the devil, and such despair is taken as a sign that the sinner is only preparing for a repetition of his sin.

The psychological acuteness of the religious viewpoint has its application in psychoanalysis where, in practice, past and future *are* actually put together in the same way, by means of the next act. Despite theoretical confusions, history is in fact grasped as a possibility and not as fate. For in the rewording of the experiences of this moment as they arise in the psychoanalytic relation, the "nightmare of the past" is abolished. That is, it becomes neutralized by being deprived of that normative value which, esthetically, is projected onto things. History, like Revelation, is not something that *was*, but something that *is*. So Jesus deals with the question by declaring: "Before Abraham was, I am." The past then becomes that which, being given, has led up to the possibility of this moment.

It is precisely in this Archimedean lever of *the moment* that an understanding of the much disputed psychoanalytic concept of "cure" can be found. (13) In the medical sense,

cure implies the idea of something finished. But psychoanalysis does not deal with disease other than as a symptom. Its avowed sphere of operation is character. Character, however, is a mode of relation to non-existential goals. A man becomes a self only through the venture of decision. And decision by its very nature is not a once-for-all occurrence, but must be renewed from moment to moment. Hence character is never something finished.

It is another matter with those therapeutic short-cuts that treat symptoms by means of an alleged psychoanalytic method. Here cure has meaning in terms of treating the visible symptomatic departures from established norms of health. Like medicine, it sets finite goals. If a man breaks a bone, the physician will treat him without taking it upon himself to inquire whether he will proceed to break the bone again. But cure in character analysis cannot be formulated as a deeper qualification of this same approach. It is not, properly speaking, "depth" psychology. For in character analysis, the individual appears *fully* as individual and no general answer can be given that is not misleading.

This much, however, can be said. In the analytic hour, cure, *as possibility*, simply happens, and quite uniquely. And it is at this moment that the teacher must venture to speak the word which, in rising to meet the happening, sends the pupil off into the venture of his own decision. The act here is a double one, although not simultaneous. Between the two ventures there is no knowing how much time will elapse.

From the point of view of scientism, however, which already presumes what form the answer must take, this view of cure is untenable. Scientism requires that a result be measurable. It has positivistic standards, but in such a case, it does not deal with individuals but abstractions of them. This is certainly pseudo-science, for science at least looks carefully at the material with which it deals and makes no presuppositions. In its concrete applications, methodology cannot be divorced from the kind of questions presupposed

by the material. When methodology is so arbitrarily employed, the wrong questions are asked and there is inevitably projected onto the data extrinsic characteristics of that other realm from which the method was drawn.

Psychoanalysis is most clearly understood in the recognition of its relation to ethics. This opens the way to grasping a dialectics significantly related to action, as in the formulation of despair as sin. Thus, to cite an instance in purely speculative fashion (14), some light can be shed on the phenomenon of transference as resistance.

In the characterology of despair, the deeper the despair, the deeper is the passion that invests it, and the greater the power for the turning back to God. Consequently, the greatest sinner is dialectically closer to God, that is, closer in the possibility of "turning" than the lukewarm man-of-virtue. This is because the latter, being less concerned about himself, is far more unlikely to seek to narrow the minor gap that separates him from God than the sinner his vast abyss.

In the same sense, transference as resistance, means a greater concern and passion potentially at the disposal of the forces struggling against the neurosis. Through these dynamics, the analyst can grasp the importance of increasing the concern so that the possibility of conversion becomes so immediate as to press for a decision. Nor need there be any fear that this potentiation of resistance is likely to compel a patient to leave the analysis, since the degree of passion negatively invested here cannot possibly find release in abandoning its object. Certainly Satan would be incapable of settling for a lesser opponent than the God who is the actual awakener of his passion. Such an eventuality is only present before a resistance totally different in kind, which is, properly speaking, no resistance. It is analogous to the unconcern of the lukewarm man-of-virtue whose solicitation of analysis has its source in some esthetic of self-improvement in which only a necessary minimum of libidinal energy is invested. This type, it should be added, is precisely the one that can give the *appearance* of the greatest concern

since the esthetic mode understands very well that the situation is one that calls for it.

VII

In the mind of every human being lurks a ghost — that other self he wishes to become. While sometimes appearing as a desire for riches or self-aggrandisement, it may also obtrude itself in more ascetic guise. But in either case the ghost stands in the way of reality. For the moment never offers more than one thing to a man. And the choice must be made between accepting what is offered or turning away. These are the sole alternatives.

A. wishes to be an artist. He has an unquestioned talent and much to contribute. It is not merely a case of some vague desire to enhance himself by donning the artist's cloak. But other affairs keep him from making the contribution for which he is well equipped. Circumstance — the need to earn a living — hinders him and employs all of his time and energy. So he lives in a virtual prison, hating the duties that weigh on him like fate, and always seeking the opportunity that will enable him to break out and live his chosen life.

Living in anticipation and seeing only through the eyes of the ghost, he is bound to miss the real opportunity, since he has decided in advance on what that opportunity shall be. So, in fact, he is not even truly looking. For it is only by facing the task that confronts him that possibility lies open to him. Yet to do this, he need not give up his passion for art. He need only turn the full force of that passion toward the demand of the present moment. The libidinal energy can be "raised" from the fantastic to the real. And by merely being attentive to the real, he is suddenly the artist he meant to be, although what it will finally be called may not go by the name of art. But this demands that he expel the ghost. He must make no presumptions about his identity. This, in Biblical language, is the meaning of "Thou canst not by

seeking find God." It means "to stand naked before the Face."

To the religious or ethical thinker, evil is an illusion. Only the moment is real. But the power invested in evil comes from God. That is, the power is *given*. And precisely because it is *freely* given, it may be turned to evil. But when this power is turned toward the real, that is, when good and evil are put together, fate is transformed into destiny and the esthetic trap is avoided. So it is from this ethical standpoint that a sharper insight is possible into the psychoanalytic concept of *libido* and the dynamics of sublimation. Space does not permit any elucidation of this point beyond calling attention to it. But, apropos the libido concept, there should be added some final remarks on the presumed goal of psychoanalysis in terms of what has been called psycho-sexual maturity.

In one sense, Freud's emphasis on the sexual origination of the libido was ethically correct. But Eros has many faces and many forms. Hesiod represented Eros as the first of the gods, but later writers depicted him as the son of Aphrodite. As a primal deity he represents the transforming power of the universe. But when Aphrodite, the goddess of Beauty, becomes the mother of Love, the transforming power is lost. Eros, or Cupid in his Roman form, is the pale esthetic reduction of the original primal force. This Eros figures only in the later literature and later cult. He is the personification of romantic love rather than fertility.

Furthermore, Aphrodite was also worshipped as a goddess of destruction, death and the underworld, these aspects deriving from Babylonian and Semitic influence. In the Orphic account of the creation, it was from the Cosmic Egg of night that the primal Eros was hatched. In the form of Protogonos (first-born) he was conceived as generator of the universe. On the other hand, Nyx, ancient goddess of night, was conceived as the mother of the day and the light. She was also, however, the mother of Thanatos, the person-

ification of death.

From this varied mythic background (equally varied in mythologies other than the Greek) the primal force is a composite of the elements of hate, love and death—as possibilities. And these are, indeed, the possibilities of pure force. In some versions, the possibilities are actualized as separate entities, and in others the entire combination seems to be the true meaning of love. That is, only when all the elements are put together can Eros be regarded as a generative power. The division into Eros and Thanatos in the later myths are purely esthetic, and love itself emerges as the absurd figure of the infantile Cupid.

The Freudian theory of the psycho-sexual character of libido exhibits much the same set of combinings and separations as the myths. Even the much debated death instinct at times expresses an affinity for physical science and the law of entropy, at others seems to stand for the psychic equivalent of the principle of evil. But the primal sexual energy as libido must be grasped as the unified power from which all these modes originate. Otherwise Freudian theory is menaced at its very foundations by structural disorder.

Freud might well have sensed that his basic energising sexuality, or love, was the original undivided Eros, without ever having formulated this intuition as theory. In his paper on "The Antithetical Sense of Primal Words," with all of the facts before him, he seems to be groping without success for the ordering principle that might have led finally to some concept of the esthetic as the category of division. In "Civilization and its Discontents," he seems unable to see beyond this category of division although the vision emerges in embryo in the superb footnote on "fire" in that same work. Had he been able to distinguish the sacred from the theology he suspected and the science he admired, he might have avoided trivializing human potentiality by reducing it to the dynamics of the Oedipus Complex. He might have grasped the true meaning of the Oedipus trilogy as the transformation of a talent for righteousness, through trial,

into its genuine possession. And he would have recognized Job.

The transmission into theory of Freud's clinical experience has led to the misunderstandings common to such labors. What the founder of modern psychoanalysis may very well have realized inwardly, in his clinical relations, appears too often, in its purely esthetic aspect in his written works. Thus in a paper written in 1913, he entertains the possibility suggested by Stekel "that hate, not love, is the primary state of feeling between human beings," although the very nature of such polar concepts totally excludes expressing one of them as antecedent to the other.

But what took place between Freud and his writings is hidden. We have only the papers whose theoretical formulations he himself has warned are not to be taken as truths. For Freud, the truth lay in practice. In the words of Plato:

... it is an inevitable conclusion from this that when anyone sees anywhere the written work of anyone, whether that of a lawgiver in his laws or whatever it may be in some other form, the subject treated cannot have been his most serious concern,—that is, if he is himself a serious man. His most serious interests have their abode somewhere in the noblest region of the field of his activity. (Epistle VII, 344 c, L. A. Post, trans., Oxford 1925)

We can assume that Freud was certainly serious. But one wonders at the motives of so many psychoanalysts who have felt the need to set down professionally, in volume after volume, qualifications of every realm of human experience. It calls to mind the avowed affinity of psychoanalysis for writers and artists, a fact rendered marvelous in books of this type, by the loved objects' inevitable emergence on the short end of the psycho-sexual measuring rod. For such cases, the last comment can also be left to Plato.

If, however, he was seriously concerned with these matters and put them in writing, then surely, not the gods, but mortals have utterly blasted his wits. (ibid)

It is no solution to gaze so longingly at art, or the sacred, from the bars of one's scientific prison, to yearn for the true

word when one can learn to speak it and so make the bars vanish. It can be guaranteed that science will somehow take care of itself without needing to be invoked. Moreover it will be the first to grant that the theoretical is merely knowledge, something finished, and hence only a presupposition. It is not even necessary to give up science, but merely to turn the passion for science back into the clinical situation so that the theoretical forms may be regasped and reexperienced in each unique hour. Then the psychoanalyst who needs it will have his science, even though in the end it may go by the name of ethics.

Lake Mahopae, New York

— NOTES —

1. Martin Buber's "Moses" is the source of my use of this concept and contains a very thorough exposition of it.
2. Cf. Plato's *Cosmology*, by F. M. Cornford, p. 29, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1937
3. *Ibid* p. 28ff.
4. The above recalls Freud's formulation of the split between the affective and the instinctual drives. However, as I shall show later, Freud, unlike Solovyev, failed to grasp the full metaphysical significance of this insight.
5. It is precisely such a notion that sustains that vociferous school of French "existentialism" of which Sartre is the most prolific exponent.
6. So, for example, the gratuitous gesture of Andre Gide is a matter of pure curiosity. It is not a concern with the present moment but with what is going to happen next. Gide is not interested in action, but with the esthetics of action. So he is not truly interested in himself, but rather in himself-as-actor, or himself as not-himself. His interest is to get away from himself
7. For a more comprehensive analysis of the way in which such restorative movements may develop, cf. Martin Buber's "Hasidism", p. 60ff. Philosophical Library, New York 1948.
8. Here we find a basis for the stereotypes of the Jew and the fact that he is so often looked upon as a member of a world-wide conspiratorial movement.

9. Or as Hegel expressed it: "Abraham, as the opposite of the whole world, could have had no higher mode of being than that of the other term in the opposition, and thus he likewise was supported by God." (*Spirit of Christianity*, included in *Early Theological Writings*, U. of Chicago Press, T. M. Knox, trans.)
10. It is significant to note how clearly an esthetically oriented thinker like Hegel understood this and how the grasp of his insight was limited by this very orientation: "The principle of the entire legislation (of Moses) was the spirit inherited from his forefathers, i.e., was the infinite Object, the sum of all truth and all relations, which thus is strictly called the sole infinite subject, for this Object can only be called "object" insofar as man with the life given him is presupposed and called the living or the absolute subject. This, so to say, is the sole synthesis; the antitheses are the Jewish nation, on the one hand, and, on the other, the world and all the rest of the human race. The antitheses are the genuine pure objects; i.e., this is what they become in contrast with an existent, an infinite, outside them; they are without intrinsic worth and empty, without life; they are not even something dead—a nullity—yet they are a something only insofar as the infinite Object makes them something, i.e., makes them not something which is, but something made which on its own account has no life, nor rights, no love." (*ibid*, p. 191.)


Hegel had an astonishing awareness of the problem, but he stood outside of it. He describes it all from the point of view of the infinite Object as though he himself were God. This was why it remained a misleading abstraction for him. As seen by man, in existence, the infinite Object is changed from an objective certainty to the highest possibility, or the experienced certainty of faith.

11. Plato too was aware of the esthetic danger in history. This is clear in the way he puts his Republic in the sky, or the future, and then, in the Timaeus, sees it as having already existed ten thousand years ago—that is, in the once-upon-a-time. (See Timaeus 17-27 incl.)
12. This is given by S. Kierkegaard in an incisive and illuminating manner in his "Sickness Unto Death", trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton 1946. It merits comparison with the far less ordered Freudian characterology.
13. In the one place I have been able to find any direct effort on Freud's part to define this concept, there appears: "... we may say that as long as the system Cs controls activity and motility, the mental condition of the person in question may be called normal."

(Collected Papers, v. IV, Hogarth Press, p. 111) Apart from the whole question of Freud's system of consciousness which cannot be discussed here, we are confronted with a purely elliptical argument in which what is supposed to be normal leads to the very constructs that are supposed to define normality.

14. Space does not permit the detailed treatment this point requires, so the designation *speculative* is used to acknowledge the omission. This is in addition to the avowedly provisional character of this entire study, the best effect of which, it is hoped, will be to invite the researches of those specialists to whom it properly belongs. On the other hand, I do not wish to lend myself to that other extreme tendency which confers omniscience on the specialist. In the words of that great sociologist, Max Weber: "Almost all sciences owe something to dilettantes, often many very valuable viewpoints. But dilettantism as a leading principle would be the end of science."

Moreover I also take this upon myself as a writer whose own field has been the object of researches in which the specialist himself has appeared as the dilettante. And it is precisely to this dilettantism that I acknowledge my researches as in some sense those of the specialist.



Morale

by

John M. Dorsey, M.D.

Introduction

"Let the incommunicable objects of nature and the metaphysical isolation of man teach us independence."

Emerson, **Manners**

Humanity has entered upon a new era, that of the release and use of atomic energy. Evidently our present state of national emergency is not transitory, but is here to stay, as we are. It is to be hoped that our awareness of our need to seek security will make us eager to study the best way to educate ourselves so that we may be as helpful as possible with each other in our difficult emergencies. The antidote to danger is corresponding care. As Glover observed, the sustenance or destruction of morale is every nation's secret weapon and "The morale of free men is the finest in the world." (1)

Atomic warfare can respect no one. Commander-in-chief, citizen, and child in the rear have no more safeguard than the man at the front. Our foremost leaders in all walks of life are required to support feelings of personal insecurity involving no less than the fear of imminent dissolution. We cannot find the same safety in numbers as before. Everyone must now consider the benefit of renouncing foreign courage in favor of his own. Nothing proves whether a man is "out of his mind," "off his base," "not himself," etc., more than the circumstance of real danger. (2) When truly frightened he turns to himself for help and if he finds little or none

1. Edward Glover, **Fear and Courage**, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1940).
2. See Sigmund Freud, **Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety** (Sanford, Connecticut: The Psychoanalytic Institute, 1927).

there he becomes frantic, unable to use what "someone else" said was helpful.

Discipline a child for months in what to do during a raid, train him ever so long to fall and lie on the right side of a brick wall, if he is not developing self-reliance the first sign of real danger will confront him with the anxiety which will nullify all of his technical resources. In a crisis only the self-possessed can attend to their anxiety and insight at the same time. What is the use of safety education to us if the development of anxiety makes it inaccessible? We need to work our heads on, not off. As far as we are concerned about individual action in extreme circumstances, the only hope for this cause is the development of self dependence. Whatever course of action we do not consent to personally cannot be executed by us.

Only insofar as safety measures represent a development in our own being and are found within our own several selves, can they be practical and well recommended. The safety of the democratic way of life depends solely and wholly upon the preparedness of each individual to defend himself. Defending our fellowman as ourself is the meaning of the word "*mankind*." Public and private defense cannot be two separate values. Private personal courage and self-confidence are made known to the world by team work of all kinds. Self culture is the only living social culture. No defense measures accumulated by anyone else are useful to us until they are verified by us.

The dislocation of any of our own mental material "somewhere else" is really impossible, although we suffer most from blind illusions of foreign mental material. The body without a mind is a dead one. Walt Whitman's prophecy of the mentally integrated American may be realized by our wholehearted devotion to the ideal of self-development: "Today ahead, though dimly yet, we see, in vistas, a copious, sane, gigantic offspring."

All government is really self government. By the same token there can be only one form of anarchy, namely, mental

disorder. There is only one cause of mental disorder, namely, self blindness. Danger cannot upset us, it can only find us upset, or right side up, as the case may be, depending upon whether or not we have grown the one way or the other. An earthquake is met by a different self quake in every creature. The mind of integration makes the best of any set of circumstances, whereas the self betrayed mind makes itself the headlong butt of all.

As our Thomas Jefferson observed, "The people themselves are the only safe depositories of government," and "to render even them safe their minds must be improved." Too many of us Americans still are of the Fisher Ames kind, willing to declare with him, "It is only by the due restraint of others, that I am free," and "of all governments the worst is . . . democracy."

We, "the people," consist of as many human worlds as human beings and demonstrate only apparently greater solidarity when disaster threatens. (3) Our co-operation, varyingly called collective life, working with social consciousness or mass mind, social cohesion, mutual aid, division of labor, etc., is accurately observed only as individuals working together alone. Every human being has his own relationships, but relationships have no other human being of their own. We commit no greater or more obvious error than to ignore every man's individuality in the name of two or more men. The biological fact is that the human constitution cannot enable the exploitation of man by man, however appearances may seem to imply the contrary. The totalitarian state, like an insect state, comes closest to living out the illusion that society is a biological organism. (4) The Darwinian principle of the survival of the fittest provides us with the best ground plan of social organization. The

3. Cf. P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid A Factor In Evolution* (New York: McClure, Phipps and Co., 1902).

4. Cf. Floyd Allport, *Social Psychology* (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1924).

"fittest" individual, by definition, fits best in his world, only supporting his ideal of living by letting live. (5)

Perspective

A certain distance from what we are seeing or observing is essential to accurate focus. When we confound our perception corresponding to an object with the object, or confound our awareness corresponding to our perception with the perception, we are out of focus. (6) "Seeing at a distance" found to be optimal is essential for keeping a clear outline of our humanity. Only by accurately locating both seer and seen as two uses in the one individual can both be felt and thus confirmed as self experience. The usual arguments, hotly or coldly but too seldom good-naturedly, raised against full measured self awareness have been used by all of us before we have attained it. A particularly fashionable resistance to our last letting go of our mother's skirts, to our severing of our psychological umbilical cords, is the cry, "Man does not live in a vacuum." Our resistances take this scientific guise as being the distraction most likely to succeed in detracting attention from our clarifying observation that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time.

The distinguishing characteristic (7) of our own acknowledged mental material is that it is defined by a two-fold identification consisting of [1] the mental material we

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5. We need continuing research on human behavior based upon observations relating exclusively to one mind such as reported by Anna Freud in *The Ego and Mechanisms of Defence* (New York: International Universities Press, Inc, 1946).
 6. "Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perception is subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with the phenomena perceived but never really discerned, so psycho-analysis bids us not to set conscious perception in the place of the unconscious mental process which is its object." Sigmund Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 104, Fifth Impression (London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1949).

call "consciousness" and [2] the other mental material related to consciousness (e.g., idea, perception, etc.), both being self felt. We recognize and outline the mental part of our own body image quite as we do the rest of it, by the realization that one and the same individual, uniquely, is both [1] perceiver and [2] perception, and both [1] observer and [2] observed. Whoever is incapable of recognizing his selfness in both subject and object cannot observe his own mental boundaries. An increasingly greater exercise of keener self-consciousness is the course of progressive evolution of the mind. (8)

What characterizes the integrated mind is its orderliness. It does not alienate observer and observed or seer and seen. *It distinguishes everything.* "Seeing" is one aspect of one's being; "seen" is another. Our mind's observing organ can observe only itself quite as our eye can see only itself. Our high or low sense organs cannot observe or see other objects, although their normal function includes such misreporting.

However our own sense organs of observation and perception cannot do more than attest that which abides in

7. This distinction is of the greatest value for the psychoanalyst because it alone determines what constitutes repression, the alienation of our own mental material from our own evaluation of it as such. Our perceptions serve us well for repression purposes in that they function as a protective mental rind against the dangers of painful excessive excitation inherent in unpropitious identification. Our capacity to perceive the reality of the external world depends on our capacity to perceive the reality of our self; because this self of ours is our only accessible object of the external world. Only after we have developed the capacity of being aware of our self, can we go on to mediate the meaning of "objectivity" to our external world in general. The more we lack insight about our being our own everything the more indistinguishable become our own self boundaries and our meaning for our "external world."
8. Whether or not we now dream in our sleep as our ancestors used their minds while awake, it seems evident that nearly all of us, now claiming to be awake, use our minds for the most part as if we were dreaming, blindly indulging our illusions that we can perceive and consider someone and something other than our self.

them, their own being, and to man's composite meaning for evidence is indispensable to man's composite meaning for his own existence. If our sense organs were an exception to this fact that everything is its own proof and is useless for proving aught else, then our sense of selfsameness, and hence of being complete entities, would be correspondingly impaired and we would suffer the blind illusion of being nobodies. Causal to mental integration which, as we describe it aptly, enables us to stand on our own feet, see with our own eyes, follow our own nose, etc., is this ability to distinguish as such every part of the whole, every individuation of the individual. The appreciation of being an individual is only as strong as its weakest link. If we alienate seer and seen by recognizing selfness in the one but not in the other we actually break the chain of appreciation of being a somebody. The fact of our individuality imposes upon us the necessity of observing our all, our everything, as within our very own confines. Therefore it is all the more necessary that the reverent meaning *individuality* be distributed *throughout* the self order and extended to each and every aspect of our being.

We do not trust the veracity of the report of the interpreter who has lost his own sense of identity. The acid test for the true watchman is his unvarying oracular announcement, "It is I," "So it is with me." All men are oracular only, but just the integrated ones are aware of their powerful limitation of self expression.

Many of us have noticed the fact that one convinced against his will is unconvinced still, and thus observed the *what* of the inadequacy of argument to convince. Let us now observe the *why* of it. The integration of our mind develops us as observers. Thus we renounce persuasion and argument in favor of observation. No more would the integrated mind rely upon argument to enhance respect for an ideal than to correct a disputant's eyesight. Either we observe or we do not; either we perceive or we do not. We cannot be "reasoned" into or out of the use of our senses

or of any other self uses. Respect for an idea cannot come from study, but only from recognizing it as being a part of our own human being.

There is no other way to experience lifelike perceptions and vital observations except through insight about, and renunciation of, their illusional value which is itself indispensable. Those of us with insight are the only seers of the only realities, those commonly designated "internal." We cannot let ourselves be blindly caught in the trap of illusional data which shrinks our self-regard and thus contracts the evident value of human being.

We cherish a health principle according to the number of things it explains about ourselves. There can be no accurate diagnosis which does not immediately suggest a cure. Blind self disesteem is our worst disease. Most of all it is difficult to acquire the habit of disabusing our minds of appearances of our external world so that it becomes possible for us to see the reality of ourselves. This is the open secret of hygienic living and the learning of it is worthy of all of our piety. Only by use of this insight can we live by our strength rather than by our weakness. Because it is the source of morale it is the primary obligation of all social workers (9) to uphold this ideal of independence and secure as much of it as possible.

The Correspondence of Morale With Mental Integration

With the possible exception of one word of it this study accepts the Webster's International Dictionary definition of the term *morale*: "Prevailing mood and spirit conducive to willing and dependable performance, steady self-control, and courageous, determined conduct despite danger and privations, based upon a conviction of being in the right and on the way to success and upon faith in the cause or program and in the leadership, usually connoting, esp. when

9. The term "social worker" is used in this writing in its broadest sense to indicate the importance of morale for all human relationships.

qualified by the adjective *high*, a confident, aggressive, resolute, often buoyant, spirit of wholehearted co-operation in a common effort, often attended particularly by zeal, self-sacrifice, or indomitableness. (10)

The one possible inconsistent word in this description is "self-sacrifice." To be sure, if the definition conceives *all* sacrifice to be self-sacrifice, then this writer finds no fault in it. By "morale" he means basically plain "grit," stick-atitiveness; the individual's mental force, or power, reliable for disposition in a given direction against all of his opposition to it. Morale thus signifies the individual's readiness for devotion to a given cause. Its strength depends entirely upon the awareness of having a mind of one's own to take care of and use well, upon the insight that all help is self help. By the "building of morale" is meant the development of the fullest possible appreciation of one's own personal identity.

Morale is manifested by each and every *one's* ability to carry on with his wits about him and to continue to act according to his best interests even while he is at the same time having to attend to feelings of being overwhelmed.

There are degrees of morale, each advance in mental integration accounting for them. The most integrated of us has the greatest force at disposal and thus can bring the most sincere will to bear upon any venture. Any one of us whose perceptions and observations are aggrandized by the "I," or "me," or "self" feeling lives nearest to mastery and farthest from panic.

Social service of all kinds is obstructed by our inability to extend our self interest to the powerful parts of ourselves we call mental. The true completion of man, his mental in-

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10. Cf. Nathaniel Warner, M.D., *The Morale of Troops on Occupation Duty*, Vol. 102, No. 6, pp. 749-757, May 1946 (*The American Journal of Psychiatry*). Dr. Warner defines morale as "the net satisfaction derived from acceptable progress toward goals or from the attaining of goals," stating that "any reasonable steps taken to enhance social consciousness in relation to the military organization will pay dividends in improved morale."

tegrity, obtains order for our fear as for all other materials of the mind, and thus reduces panic to plan. Morale is no preparation or arrangement, other than integration in the mind. It is the product of the training of insight. (11) All mental material which is recognized as such is morale building; all mental material which is miscalled something or somebody else is demoralizing. A given quantity of morale belongs to a given quantity of self observation and the sum totals of the two correspond.

Whatever disturbs our sense and observation of being an organic whole dispirits us. (12) One's own mind is the home of all of his morale as of all other self meanings. Every man has a courage in direct proportion to the degree and extent of his self reference, and the most confident creature has attained the most insight. The best man of war as of peace is the most self reliant. The greatest hero is just that because he is not blind to that part of his own mental material standing for greatest cowardice. We become true patriots when, as William James described it, (13) we are capable of pacific civic passion devoted to waging war against war.

Morale is potent in companies through providing each member with the bond of *self union* which makes for any and all united effort of mankind. Our very own self meanings are the meanings on which we draw to uphold our observation of order. For example, the antidote to our cowardice is its being observed as blind fear of one part towards

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11. At McGregor Center, our Hospital for Rehabilitation and Health Education, our health rule states: Strength enters us just to the extent that the element of self interest prevails. This is a medical doctrine of ineffable comfort, permitting us to see our way out of the dark dungeon of blind illusion. Again, this great truth is not hurt by our disregard for it, but we are.
 12. Cf. Otto Fenichel, *The Concept of Trauma in Contemporary Psycho-analytical Theory*, Vol. 26, pp. 33-44, 1945 (*The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*).
 13. William James, *The Moral Equivalent of War*, 1910, Documents of The American Association of International Conciliation, No. 27.

another part of our own self. Without fear there is no courage. Courage consists in the observation that our opposition is ours, hence neither stronger nor weaker than us. Mob terror and mob violence depend entirely upon mob anonymity. Undaunted self affirmation is the explanation of the determined man who performs with the self-possession which rules that his opposition is not "there" somewhere else, but "here" in himself.

Morale first appears in the form of self interest and then develops parrallel with self esteem and self devotion. (14) To have highest morale is to be able to see and concentrate upon self from top to bottom. A man of morale is such only because he can see more order in apparent disorder than his neighbor. This he can do only because he is aware of more of his self order, finding living space there even for the meaning "disorder." He relates himself best to his meaning for all in his external world by growing to consult the appearance of the principal (the external object) for determining accuracy of the reality of the proxy (his mental representation for the external object.)

It can only be demoralizing for us not to find our self at the heart of every matter. Morale cannot be gained except by the mind which affirms its own existence. What is good but to acknowledge the claim of the right of all to be? And what is bad but to repudiate that very same claim? In fields of force, of stress of any kind, quite as Thoreau reported, the best lightning rod for our protection is our own spine. We can never have anything so much to fear as fear which is not recognizable for what it is, our own fear of our own self's hostility. The self-centered mind is the tower of strength to turn to when the rest are seeing themselves out of their minds, as it were, in revolutions, rebellions, or riots. (15)

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14. Cf. N. Searl, *Danger: Situations of the Immature Ego*, Vol. 10, pp. 423-435, 1929, (*The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*).
 15. See James Bryant Conant, *Wanted: American Radicals*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, CLXXI, pp. 42-45, May, 1943.

It benefits us most to apprise ourselves of the powerful mental order which mounts as insight mounts. Steady devotion to the truth of selfsameness enables each of us to be "on the level" with himself. Otherwise we are as if "carried away" by that which we cannot observe we are carrying. Mental maturation enforces the insight that our fiercest repudiations share the attribution of our choicest selections. We mature finally to the development of observing all of our being in the affirmative, of observing that negation can have only the kind of nihilistic affection produced by closing our eyes to, or withdrawing our attention from, existing selfness.

In exact and direct proportion to our recognized self observation, to our opening our mental eyes, it appears that our life meanings approach a parallelism with all of the other forces of nature, and everything that happens to us, either pleasant or unpleasant, is accepted more naturally as of necessity. Conversely, in proportion to our ignorance of our human nature we depart from the way of making the best of necessities.

Self directed attention, self-consciousness, is all that can let us into reality. Our attention directed "elseward," that is, to our otherness, without the insight that it is our own mental material, dims our awareness of our personal identity, and thus specifically furthers our demoralization.

Using self awareness is a health exercise for the sensorium of our mind which is indispensable for the development of a full appreciation of our personal identity, our selfsameness. The constant need of every human being is to find living room in his own mind. The antidote for unmanliness, unwomanliness, synonyms for demoralization, is that which mans us, devotion to our very own mental material. Every experience is morale building which provides us with another view of our several selves. The living is healthiest which contains the most acknowledged self perceptions and self observations.

All mental material that we repudiate, in the sense of

ignoring that its substance is our own life meaning, continues in us as our own untried unknown power, but instead of furthering order it promotes disorder. It promotes the worst disorder of all in supporting the illusion of the senses as to what constitutes the material of which we are made. Common illusion, not common sense, calls our sham of observing the external world "reality," and our truth of self insight "shameful."

The privileges and responsibilities which lie in one part of our mind lie in all, whether or not we attempt the impossible of withholding them. He whose self meaning is most vast has the greatest self affirmed correspondence with the all, with the universe. Our chief cause for discontent as human beings is the poverty of our idea of self, and every "leader of the people" has been distinguished by a self comprehension greater than his followers, who must follow, quite as water must seek its own level. Those of us enduring unrelieved impoverishment of our idea of self have no recourse other than to lean more heavily upon our "otherness," indemnifying our overworked partial identity with thieving taxes upon unidentified selfness, all manifested in illness, including criminality or ill manners. All demoralization results from the wild striving of our poorly integrated mind to express our whole self.

When reflexly we start our complaint of our "others" it benefits us to recognize that the real source aim and object of complaint are within our plenteous self, because if we know just where the trouble is we are enabled to help ourselves. As Emerson observed, "No change of circumstances can repair a defect of character." On the other hand, when reflexly we start our praise of our "others" it profits us to observe that the real source aim and object of our praise are within our self, because if we know just where the greatness is we are enabled to help ourselves. No set of "wonderful" circumstances can be observed except the observer be wonderful. Our only way to praise or blame accurately is

to "own up" to being what we are praising or blaming, overlord and underling.

The Building of Morale

The advantage of the principle of selfsameness over the popular theories of education to morale is that it presents the perspective which is most favorable to the human constitution. It, only, accords with the powerful force of observation. The healthiest man is he who learns from living the lesson of self development. The reason that this powerful truth often seems faint and weak is because it is found deep in the core of the mind. A human health axiom may be formed to the effect that whatever seems farthest fetched in the mind is that which needs to be brought closer.

We live all of our meaningful life in a psychological world, one which stands upon, and is structured of, mental materials; and our means and end of life are to personify and reverently subordinate our experiences in our human constitution. Thus we develop the magnanimity of the world citizen. "Love thy foe as theyself" is the general idea essential to morale building. Identifying every opposing force in turn with our own being is necessitated by the way we are made, and the sense of identity is equality. Actually each of us goes through life with only one true reaction to all he senses or observes, namely, "Meet your equal."

How to respect our newest dangerous experience without disrespecting the rest of our human being is the statement of the problem of morale. The evident answer to terminating the "taking in" provided by our perceptions and observations is the cessation of their yielding the particular nourishment needed. The well integrated mind does not draw upon the meaning of sudden attack or of imminent destruction beyond getting the good out of it. Then its concentration is withdrawn to other required resources, and thus it pro-

16. Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Essay on Character*.

ceeds depending upon its keen perceptions of rewards and penalties.

There is only one kind of confusion possible for man, namely, mental confusion. *All else is clear order.* That appears demoralizing in our external world for which we have not yet developed just representation in our own mind. By keeping this mental law we maintain the self order. Every instance of demoralization involves what is most privately intimately and secretly personal. The social worker of high morale comprehends, subsumes, his observations related to those with whom he enters into a treatment procedure. Absolute skill qualifications besides his special techniques are his ability to [1] recognize his identification with his client, [2] continue with awareness of being self contained, and [3] treat himself well.

A social worker who does not see himself in his client has the appearance of being on the case, but is really not present, has not the presence of mind that is healing, but suffers the mental absence that is diseasing. He practices his profession somewhat as a bag of tricks. Each and every mental operation that is not accredited selfsameness is the product of a mental illusion, and is trickery, not truth. The very word kindness implies the likeness of self. At the very time when the city of Naples was being racked with laughter by the antics of the celebrated comic Carline, a patient racked with unrelieved feelings of depression asked a physician to help him. "Go see Carline," prescribed the doctor. The patient replied, "I am Carline."

Basically the problem presenting for each of us in a reign of terror is the same, namely, to avoid devotion to a reign of terror only, and to aim at considering the reign of terror for what it may be worth in terms of the rest of our mental material. Self trust depends upon this self equipoise.

The ill integrated mind must "sell out to the opposition." This mind is fascinated by every reign of terror it is called upon to represent and can use it very little as a signal "to

bring order to bear," as an indicator of its antidote, self mastery. The well integrated mind, in being saved from the blind illusional dislocation of his reign of terror outside of himself, can use this particularly pressing mental material quite as all of the rest, with the result that it never takes over in the sense of being the tail that wags the dog. Consequentially he is enabled to behave in a way calculated to represent his best interests under the circumstances. Observing them as our own mental material is the true meaning of mastery of our self experiences and what we mean by the expression, "surmounting" them. The rule in our training to morale is that just as soon as we lose command of our mental material, it commands us, unmans us. Whatever mans us strengthens morale.

Our illusions that we can experience unself are our natural healthy infirmity, and have lifesaving significance. However all of us who have our imagination free are able to employ it with the insight that it is *all* about our self, and fear cannot run riot where it applies equally to all. Self insight clears up all of the confusion which results from our fancying blindly that we can jump out of our skin. Only our growing big enough to love our very own enemies as ourselves can deliver us from the evil trick of harming in the name of helping.

Our unawareness of the following truth does not alter it, but does harm us. *No man is free to misbehave in any way.* His human constitution is so constructed that a loss to anyone is a loss to him, a gain to anyone a gain to him. The true definition of loss or gain for him must be described in terms of his own constitutional necessity to represent both loser and gainer. Each of us is bound to take care of his representations for his world as they are part of his own life. Only our unawareness of this truth accounts for all of our harmful human relationships. We cannot lie to ourselves about the exclusively personal meaning of our representations and remain healthy.

Why every human being wishes to free every other

human being all over the world, exactly to the extent that the ideal of freedom holds meaning for him, is that his own constitution imposes this necessity in that all of its meanings for all of its world are purely constitutional. The more integrated our mind the more its meanings correspond with the necessities in its external world. (17) Justice for all is a necessary ideal to uphold every person's constitutional order. Health to all is a necessary ideal to uphold every person's constitutional normalcy. Devotion to all is a necessary ideal to avoid every person's constitutional neglect. Most desirable is it that our insight cover the scope of human nature.

When the day dawns in which we develop the insight that our fear of what "others" would do or say or think or even observe about our conduct, has been the sole cause of our inability to renounce our misconduct — that day dawns upon a mind that has cleared up such baseness. For the first time poorly invested fear, fear of an impossible condition, becomes available for its real use, to prevent one's harming one's self. All of our views of everything are seen clearly only by the light of the torch of self.

When a man passes out of the self blind into the self perceiving living, the consequent mental enlargement is so pleasing that it distracts the beneficiary from the importance to himself of staking his claim upon its source, of patenting the process to operate for his continuing benefit. Victory of recognition of self over apparent unself is the account of the winning of any civilization worthy of the name. Pending this specific kind of triumph, mankind must suffer the degradation implicit in the losses of *real* self to *apparent* unself. Infatuation with the apparent unself of sun, moon, stars, and earthly "wonders" is our only costly conceit. We cannot suffer from our vanity which is applied to the truth of human worth and wonder. Only demoralized people suffer

17. See Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1930).

the mischief of not knowing their own flag, of firing on their own body of forces.

The effect of our conceiving our universe becomes noxious as our meaning for it appears to dwarf us, rather than to enlarge our self view. There is no other way to quicken our highest faculties than the one way of attending to them. Devoting our interest in them provides them with the exercises needed for them to accumulate power.

To postpone one's more constricted interests for broader claims for one's "others" is to indulge and enjoy the essence of one's religion which binds selfness with love, with adoration. Allegiance to all of self is the right incentive to duty, fidelity, humility, morality of all description. Every man is his own wonderful end and what and whom he "meets with" in life are his wonderful means.

We observe our godliness when we see that we can do no wrong. The grandeur of this ethical statement is unsurpassed. Those of us who have been able to develop the insight that whatever is is right, that everything must be in its causes just, by this very process *behold* the soul stirring truth that we never did anything "wrong" in our lives, that it is impossible for anyone ever to do anything wrong. With this observation we can renounce our excessive investment of our valuable guilt feelings in blame and reproach, in our cry baby philosophy, and have them available for profitable investment in becoming responsible for our selfhood. Our mind's capacity to designate one part of itself as "good" and another part of itself as "bad" is a highly valuable kind of reflex which is most useful for first screening of helpful and harmful experiences. Everything has its place. For example, it is desirable to be able to react to injury reflexly with pain, however we do not, therefore, consider our lives to be dominated by pain.

We the people make only one mistake in the area of what we call our "relationships," namely that of claiming blindly that what is, need not be. The qualification "blindly" is used to indicate that there is nothing "wrong" about

any mental material, even self disesteem, except its not being *seen* as our own wonderful mental material. There is only one kind of "name calling" which is sane, calling our own name. Criticism is never scientific either in letter or spirit because in both it carries the implication of prejudice against what is. There is no contending against facts, no use arguing against whatever is, as Newton observed.

Seeing himself in it is man's only real victory over nature. Health education is the persevering effort to realize this ideal as being entirely practical. The best educator has the quickest eye for the growth opportunity of observing the natural order in his guilt feelings. He has discovered that guilt investment in reflex reactions of accusation, unrelieved by insight, is slow suicide. The feeling of self disesteem is a valuable primitive part of our standard human equipment. However if we mature mentally we subordinate this human reflex to the integrating insight that "we have always done the best we could under our existing circumstances, that all we needed was to be able to help ourselves more and we would have had a better best." The feeling of blind self disesteem is most commonly expressed in disesteem for our own so-called "others" and thus contributes all the more to our demoralization.

Insight, our mind's eyes, observes that all accusation is self accusation, brings our valuable primitive reflex reaction of accusation into the conditions of sensibility which enables and enforces the transition from being hurt in our life experience to unobstructed appreciation of our own wonderfulness and improvability. Of our guilt, as of logic and of all of our human resources, it benefits us most to attain the insight which beholds it as a fine tool but a poor master. Guilt which accuses us without the relieving insight that we can do no wrong furthers demoralization and diseases of all kinds. Here as in all else looking in the right direction, within, enables us to see all truly, with the power and habit of insight, our real lamp of Aladdin. Thus we may see ourselves for the

first time as man in the Garden of Eden. Quite as Emerson said, "It is in vain to make a paradise but for good men."

The great social workers among us observe that their greatness has resulted from their renunciation of their narrow selfishness and their falling back upon what is universal and godly in human being. Self trust is our only way for us to express faith in our godliness.

Only mind integrating experiences honor humanity. Devotion to, love of, the end self growth, is the requirement of self growth. The idea of assuming man as his own end conjures up a picture of such pure vanity, however, that it is quickly repudiated (repressed) as insanity. Yet we can grow to self greatness only in proportion to our recognized and avaricious love of self greatness. Loving self greatness is willing it. No doubt, as Plutarch observed, "If it were a thing obvious and easy for every man to know himself, the precept had not passed for an oracle." All dishonor lies in self depreciation, e. g. as when utility to self of any self experience (such as a sharing loss and gain) is disclaimed. That human benefit which is not mutual (shared by all humanity including the benefactor) can pass under the guise of honor, shows how low our insights can sink.

The following insight is regarded as constituting the greatest usefulness of a social worker: I observe, I see, that I can never find out anything whatsoever about the client. Every interview serves only to reveal to me turns and changes in myself. My client's individuality is inviolate, absolutely. As an individual he is as inaccessible to me as I am to him.

The nourishing and healing quality of attention to selfness is the distinguishing attitude of the most helpful social worker. To our ardent minds it seems a noble devotion to have our heart in the welfare of our fellowmen, to practice our social work in a client centered way. However morale building requires our devotion to our own soul or self-center where we find the only truth that strengthens and heals.

Every single instance of successful psychotherapy is a case of the patient's seeing that his troublesome ideas and

feelings are solely and wholly from and about himself and no one else. Every single instance of psychopathology is a case of the patient's blindly declaring someone else or something else is playing an important role, usually a troublesome one, in his own life.

The only way in which anyone has been able to help himself with us is specifically determined by our fuller acceptance of selfhood than his. There are two ways of prizing human being. One way regards the few of mankind as great, the many as small. The other way regards all of mankind as great, only the few being aware of their greatness. Of these two perspectives, we cannot but speak as one of authority, conscious of our superior position, of our power founded in our insight. The former way is that of tradition, the binding power. It has been yielding to experiment, the liberating power. There is direct correspondence observed between the social worker's conduct, his conduct of his "cases," the conduct of his organs and his awareness of his own greatness. There can be no superfluity of self-regard because it taxes each of us with living up to our self opinion, to living out what great ones we are. (18) On the contrary, each of us needs all of the help he can get to make the most of himself. There is no unemployment problem in the human mind except this one: Are we using our powers by the only means possible, with our insight that they are ours? or, Are our powers using us by the only means possible, with our lack of insight that they are ours?

There is absolutely no moral force without self interest, and all of the virtues are particular directions of this incentive. This wonderful sentiment of self reverence is most essential to the healthy development of the human being. Jesus was accurately called the healer in that he affirmed the divinity in his self and in us, without any middle agent.

18. See Sydney Lester, *The Structure of World Order in Terms of Regional Functional Organizations*, Social Forces, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 52-56, October, 1950.

Because social work towards morale involves attention to the strongest feelings, fiercest emotions, of mankind, it is necessary that the worker grow to experience these emotions in a self-contained, matter-of-fact way — not disinterestedly, not dispassionately, but self-composedly. Hardest of all is it to be “good and angry.” The morale builder remains sober and collected under fire, “carries his emotions like a gentleman.” Such is the measure of his deep social worth. Otherwise his personal influence contributes to demoralization and the furtherance of disorder and disease.

Most important of all for morale building is that the individual be cultured in a medium of self love. It has been found that love is the healing sentiment of all human beings and that an act of love necessitates a reaction of love. Children who stayed with their parents and benefited from the feelings of love and security they had around their mothers and fathers were able to withstand the blitz attacks in England better than children who were separated from their

That rationale of morale building is healthiest in which the worker recognizes that everyone must treat himself, must cure himself. In this sense getting morale, or getting healthy, follows the pattern of religious education. Everyone must save his own soul, no one can save it for him. The policies of “making someone else holier” or of “holier than thou,” simply do not pay and are to be avoided.

All of us professional treatment personnel need, and must see that we secure, special help for maintaining our own healthy morale. The “change of air” idea is a beneficial one. Our working hours are devoted necessarily to attending to weakness and meanness. The antidote, the “change of air,” indicated is clear, namely, the devotion of our attention to the greatness and wonderfulness in ourselves, the cultivation of families. (19)

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19. See Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham, *First Report on Hostel for Children Rescued from Concentration Camps, (Foster Parents' Plan for War Children, New York, February, 1946, pp. 2-3).*

tion of our healing feelings of piety, reverence, worship. Experience teaches the medical man, that it is impossible to enjoy the full measure of health without being able to attend to the tonic invigorating bracing self feeling of adoration.

The question is, How can we represent the predominance of mental power in the balance of powers? Because every immorality is a departure from success in this direction and is punished by natural loss and disease, let us be the first to observe that our attention to our morale, as to all virtue, is spotty.

Our conduct does not chime well enough with our ideal of devotion to self development. Many of us would prefer to claim lower standards, more consistent with our inferior practice, than acknowledge our inconsistency, insincerity, and disorder occasioned if we claim higher standards. All of us who hold the highest standards endure the greatest humiliation and mortification. Our slips are not understood by our fellowmen who use them to hurt themselves: "There is one of these high minded hypocrites — see how he looks away up and falls away down." However we have learned that we grow only to the level of our devotion and it does not pay us to put a low ceiling over our capacity to develop. If there is any one lesson which our work in self development has taught us it is to agree that we must be ready to eat and drink insult with relish and that such readiness does not imply blind submission to degradation but rather implies a man whose sense of power has no blind need of flatteries, a man whose attractions are from within and not from without. Flattery of "someone else" is one of the most vicious forms self conceit can assume.

An enlightened public is beginning to ask of its servant, Is he sincere? By "sincere" is meant, Does he practice what he prescribes? Our fellow patients are discovering that we all treat what we are, that the extent of self acceptance, self insight, we have attained, corresponds exactly with our therapeutic power. The true social worker is he who prescribes his own growing way of life, a life of a veteran in the mean-

ing of health and disease. This man is cast in the highest mold. A simple test for his readiness for social service is the following: In his presence are we able to see our own hypocrisy more clearly and thus enabled to renounce it? If not, then the worker needs help in this particular area. Those of us who have made the most observations of the operations of our minds would expect the powers of demoralization to seek concealment behind the form of social work.

Conclusions

Living by the sanity principle that all observation is self observation, the sovereignly seeing of our self, is the development of adult morale. Unceasing restoration of this insight to comprehend each new access of self development enables mental maturity to endure and prevents the misuse of any continuing life experience from throwing us back on insensible vitality. Our mental material which tingles with the selfness quality characteristic of all of our wonderful sensual life lets us *feel* most beneficially that it is good to be alive. Self meaning is the only thoroughly healthy meaning possible and the mind which employs it steadily is progressively breaking new ground and mending its boundaries to enclose it.

Each one of us can stand for one human world because he numbers one, but it is rare for any of us to be invincibly self observant, to be deferent from self reverence, to be poised in the sense of self poised, to be aware of his full measured manly force. Yet devotion to the whole man is all that can observe his proportion, and all that can unite men. Men of morale of the first magnitude are aware that blind efforts at self nihilism disunite the appreciation of the greatness of our human nature and give a false bias to all perception and observation.

In companies of two or more, in committees, board meetings, or any co-operative efforts of our several selves, we can avoid mob anonymity and practice the rules of order to the extent that the individual members are mentally integrated. Demoralization is demonstrated in innumerable ways once we

succumb to the blind illusion that we can help or hurt anyone but our self. This self blindness accounts for all poor collaboration. One well integrated person is a great boon in every meeting intended to promote orderly procedure.

Nature authorizes morale building, works education to health, whenever we are in the presence of one who is more self observant than we are. Perceiving our own mental representations of his insight is most comforting and inductive to our improved self care. His vastly extended caring for his own world has its esteemed center and periphery in his own mind. All of us exert this power in varying degree. There is no way for us to avoid riot except by minding our own business, by renouncing blind impersonations. It is inaccurate to report that one mind can overpower, or be overpowered by, another. The strong mind has only influence over itself and no influence over a weak one, but the weak one strengthens itself in the presence of the strong one.

All human beings are ranked in a morale scale according to the measure of their capacity for self observation. He who encloses most in his vista of self observation is thus a morale building medium for all who fall below his level on the scale. Individuals who revere most of their individuality are the most efficacious health centers of the community to which they belong. They are the least vulgar and are, to modify Napoleon's terse description, victory integrated. This accuracy of self measurement is the essence of mental integration.

Anyone who has the power of self observation well developed discovers the principle of justice to all, every attempted transgression of which constitutes self punishment because it blinds its liar to his falsehood. Impartiality, the natural consequence of love of all, sheds itself as naturally as sunshine or snowfall. Insight is the only morale builder. Only being in favor of everybody and of everything can guarantee justice to all of our self and thus contribute our share to universal harmony. When blindly we uphold our illusion that we are capable of observation other than that of self we interfere with the process of mental integration and

hinder healthy human fellowship. All attempts either at usurpation or at abdication must fail. It is only by disciplined usage that the mind's eye learns to see selfness in all it surveys. The hypocrisy, self blind altruism, alone explains why the most wretched of human beings are still to be found in the countries called the most civilized.

Summary

1. Our greatest need of all, seldom acutely felt, is to improve and increase our insight quite as we have exalted our vision far beyond its natural acumen. All "distinction" of phenomena takes its rise from this insight. When insight is most needed is when it is hardest to summon. It is most beneficial to be humane just at the time when it is most difficult to attend to humaneness. Insight that experience is self experience is the true source and significance of our prized morale.

2. In the very beginning of life there is self development and already then self direction is all important for the individual. The progress of humanity is steadily through its identity with the prescription: Physician Heal Thyself.

3. Only our experiences which are sensed as self experiences are well regulated by our pleasure-pain propensities.

4. This truth of allness of self derives from direct observation and the discernment of it marks the superior mental integration quite as all veracity is accessible only to consciousness of perception.

5. By the very highest health ideal we refer to the realization that all health is the issue of wholesome self development, the outcome of self growth nourished by self love and self reverence. The remedy to all demoralization is the devotion to man's highest ideal, namely, the continuing cultivation of his own self-esteem which includes his loving his neighbor as himself. In our discipline and training for morale we would do well to exchange for the "practical reminder," "What has this to do with the price of tea in China?" the question, "What has this to do with me" We

ask not, "Does it hold water?," but rather, "Does it hold me?" What are our fellowmen made of? How do we affirm their existence? What is the texture of our meaning for them? Illusional fiber, or our own flesh and blood? Sometimes men have exchanged names with their friends to signify love.

6. Devotion to our exalted human ideal of self fulfillment is the morale builder.

7. The very highest ideal is the most difficult of all to cherish and to attain.

8. To uphold and strive towards this ideal is to lead an educator's life. Such insight upon educational heights we can least afford to forget, disregard for it being paid for in loss of health.

9. Our present general health status is the natural consequence of our degrees of devotion to our highest health ideal.

10. Once the individual senses the meaning of the growth of his higher powers, the health significance of his access to rarely reached truths, then it may be said of him that he knows better than to misprize the benefits deriving from his further development.

11. An insight which may be very easy to view quickly, and yet very difficult to practice, is the realization of the absolute necessity to strive constantly for human consent. There is no willing of anything except to the extent that it is loved. The awful illusion that high morale co-operation can issue from arbitrary commandment is costliest of all.

12. Whenever one loves he is instantly strengthened and puts off illness. The defect of the popular limited way of using the mental part of the body is that it repudiates much of selfness and thus obstructs the use of love. Behavior that is not motivated by love results from the self wrong, the chief illness in the world, of being unable to consider one's self a unit. Man's constitution is a unity which determines his growth, health and happiness favorably to the degree that it is observed to be a unity. The application of this flesh feeling remedial force changes human disorganization

into integration. Only the ill are not deeply and widely in love. The more love a man employs the more healthy living he enjoys.

13. Our progress in morale building depends upon two commingling achievements offered in their natural sequence: 1) valuing our self more, and 2) valuing more of our self. Kindness, the strength of psychoanalytic work, is the natural expression of the attainment of these two developments. So called "self sacrifice," a variety of the taking of one's own life, can not do the work of at-one-ment, defined here as progress in the reverence for one's individuality. There is no real human strength apart from human kindness despite the innumerable appearances to the contrary. One gets the impression that there is an ignored necessity for all of us to increase our devotion to this one and only health principle. Since each of us is a world to himself, his greatest concern might be considered as that of extending as fully as possible his feelings of kindness, because all is his kind. Love thy neighbor as thyself, because in every possible sense as far as thou are concerned, he is thyself.

14. Low morale allows us the blind illusion of being "objective," quite as if such a perspective were at all possible. The real source of error in the phenomenological approach is the absolute impossibility of anyone's describing any other person or thing but himself. The work which deals wholly and solely with such truth will accomplish the most for mankind. Blind insistence that it is possible to be "objective" is thoroughly understandable in terms of a compelling need to disown our mental material followed by the necessary compromise of using it without feeling responsible for it. We repress our mental material in the effort to neglect its painfulness. We maintain the repression so that we can hurt ourselves without being aware of feeling the hurt. No one can have anything to do, or be, with anything but itself, its oneness. One perception or thought or feeling can not include or in any way have meaning for another. "Yes" does not have anything to do with "No," and vice versa. In

our *Imagination* exists the only form and substance we can possibly sense. Only by means of our full imagination can we be mentally strong and well. (20)

15. If we define dirt as "matter in the wrong place," it is the poorly integrated mind which is the dirty one. Any individual mental material which is not held in the highest esteem, in the sense of being consciously welcome selfhood, well met selfness, can not function freely, is "out of order," contributes to demoralization. In self treatment the self healing process is fully described as that of cultivating this high esteem for feared mental material, feared because in its oppressed existence it can not be observed as a self use indispensable to serving our best interests.

16. For all of us whose mental integration has not proceeded to subsume all of our "otherness," the long list of virtues which compose altruism, such as kindness, tenderness, etc., *must* be headed by the negation, "unselfishness." The unintegrated mind needs stopgap mental material with which to patch the holes in its integrity, such as "vicarious principle," "self-sacrifice," "selfless," "impersonal," "self-effacement." All such expressions, including the one, "good example," are clearly sanctimonious for the whole man who senses his wholeness. When each one of us blindly observes otherwise, he exists on the awful level which holds that one

20. In the psychoanalytic method we have a health tool the efficacy of which depends upon the accuracy of the analyst's and the analysand's concept of health. Each of these workers uses the analytic situation properly for the purpose of helping himself. What is meant by the overcoming or "lifting" of repressed material is not riddance, subordination, surmounting, or organization, but rather *integration*. Most difficult of all to attend to as our renounced, rather than repressed, mental material is our blind indulgent use of all of our "otherness" meanings. To our two helpful observations, "Our perception of the given object is not that object," and "Our awareness of the given perception is not that perception," we may do well to add a third, "Our awareness of the given awareness is not that awareness."


man's loss can mean another man's gain, that one man's gain can mean another man's loss.

17. The only correct use of the word "unselfishness" would be to indicate the necessity that each of us renounce his own *status quo*, his own existing self order, so that he can "put on" the new self order resulting from ever accumulating self experience such as our perceptions, the analogues of our otherwise inaccessible external world. Emerson, whose utterances speak a greatly integrated mind, expressed this insight about man's expanding selfhood in his poem, "The Sphinx":

"The heavens that now draw him
With sweetness untold,
Once found, — for new heavens
He spurneth the old."

18. This study of morale has carried the meaning of selfness to the extreme, the extreme of sanity. Highest sanity is the epitome of constitutional health. Self consciousness is the highest function of the sensorium, that lawgiver which, by its hierarchy of sense of what serves man's best interests, by its graduated perception of distinctions helpful and harmful to man, provides the steering faculties recognized in the aggregate as character.

Wayne University
College of Medecine
1512 St. Antoine St.



On The Anal Origin Of Money

by

William H. Desmonde, Ph.D.

In his essay, "Character and Anal Erotism," Freud pointed out the unconscious equation between money and excrement, and called attention to this phenomenon in primitive cultures. Ferenczi also predicted (1) that historical research would reveal a parallelism between the development of money in the growth of civilization and in individual maturational processes. This essay offers a contribution to Ferenczi's hypothesis.

The orthodox numismatic theory of the origin of coinage is that coins originated with the placing of the signet of the issuing agent upon a lump of metal, to guarantee its weight and its genuineness. According to Macdonald,

"Originally, then, coins were simply pieces of sealed metal impressed with the emblem either of the issuing city or of the responsible magistrates. Whatever special influences may have come into play subsequently, types were at the outset no more than signets." (2)

Barclay V. Head took a similar position on the origin of coinage:

"We may take it therefore as certain that the . . . type placed by authority on metal intended to circulate as money was simply the signet or guarantee of the issuer, a solemn affirmation on the part of an individual or of a State, that the coin was of just weight and good metal. . ." (3)

The custom of placing a seal upon property to safeguard the object and to guarantee its value was widespread long prior to the minting of coins, and the above theory presumes that coinage stemmed from this practice. According to Herodotus, money originated in Lydia in the seventh century, B.C. The same author relates, however, that, among the Babylonians, each man carried a signet. Macdonald says that there is every reason to believe that this custom had pre-

ailed from immemorial antiquity. It was undoubtedly familiar to the Lydians and other peoples of Asia Minor in the eighth century, B.C. As we can determine from the laws of Solon, the practice of sealing, at a later period, played a very important part in Athenian commerce. The great jars of pottery which were exported from Hellas were made to regulation sizes, and a seal was placed upon them, to guarantee their capacity. In the words of the nineteenth century numismatist, Burgon:

"As the act of impressing a seal or signet was an understood sign of solemn compact from the most early periods; and as engraved seals and signets were undoubtedly in general use long anterior to the invention of coining, it appears highly probable that the original idea of impressing a stamp on the uncoined lumps of gold or silver, was most probably derived from the common application of a seal to wax. The earliest coins may therefore be looked upon as pieces of sealed metal. . ." (4)

According to Newberry, the origin of the seal quite likely goes back to the very institution of the right of private property. In all of the countries of the ancient world, the seal was used as a signature.

"Doubtless in the earliest times only the most powerful persons possessed seals, but as civilization advanced the officers of the administration came to use, besides their own personal seals, official ones for government purposes. Thus it was that the seal, being the real instrument of the power and authority of an office, came to be used as the symbol of it, and the delivery of an official or State seal to an individual, gave to that individual the authority and power to execute the rights and duties of his office." (5)

There were two types of signets used in antiquity: the scarab and the cylinder seal — the latter having originated from the primitive bead. The signet-ring was probably a later development from the scarab or the cylinder seal. Both of these types of signet devices also had an important magical significance as charms and amulets.

We shall concern ourselves here with the Egyptian scarab, showing that it originated from anal conceptions.

The scarab was extremely popular in ancient Egypt. Millions of them were made, to be worn by *fellahs*, who strung them around their neck to be employed as seals. (6) Indeed, scarabs are found all through the Mediterranean areas that had commercial relations with Egypt.

"Archaeologists frequently find in lands bordering on the shores of the Mediterranean sea, scarabs and scarabeoids, on which are engraved subjects which are Egyptian, Chaldean, Assyrian, Hittite, or Persian; they are intended apparently to be used as signets, and were incised with short inscriptions in Phoenician, and sometimes, in Aramaic or in Hebrew, giving the name of the owner of the signet." (7)

The beetle was venerated in Egypt from prehistoric times. Models of beetles found in prehistoric Egyptian graves were used as amulets, and the earliest form of the seal in Egypt was that of a scarab. (8)

Our next task is to inquire into why the scarab was venerated, and imbued with a magical significance. Petrie said that the statements of the ancient writer Horapollon throw much light on the reason for the religious significance of the scarab in ancient Egypt:

"To denote an *only begotten*, or, *generation*, or, a *father*, or the *world*, or, a *man*, they delineate a scarabaeus. And they symbolize by this, an *only begotten*; because the scarabaeus is a creature self-produced, being unconceived by a female; for the propagation of it is unique and after this manner: — when the male is desirous of procreating, he takes the dung of an ox, and shapes it into a spherical form like the world; he then rolls it from him . . . then having dug a hole, the scarabaeus deposits this ball in the earth for the space of twenty-eight days. . . . By thus remaining under the moon, the race of scarabaeus is endued with life. . ." (9)

A similar statement concerning the religious significance of the beetle in ancient Egypt was made by Plutarch. Percy E. Newberry writes that the *scarabaeus sacer* is remarkable for,

" . . . its habit of rolling up balls of excrementitious matter in which the female encloses her eggs. The balls of dung the insect rolls about the sand until they become coated with a thick layer of dust, and grow to a size often as large as the

insect itself. The Egyptians, who were always keen observers of nature, early noticed this remarkable habit. . ." (10)

Thus, the sacred beetle, worn as an amulet-signet by millions of people, was believed by the ancient Egyptians to arise from excrement. Since, in its later development as a seal, the scarab played an important part in the origin of coinage, we may regard the beginning of coined money as associated with the primitive anal erotic fantasies.

34-20 78th St.

Jackson Heights 72, N. Y.

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
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